




UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 




CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN  







TESI DI LAUREA 
 
 















LAUREANDO: Simone Tuggia 
 









Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto o in 
parte, per il conseguimento di un  titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o straniere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione dell’elaborato 
sono stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le eventuali citazioni 
testuali sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubblicazione originale.  
 
The candidate declares that the present work is original and has not already been submitted, 
totally or in part, for the purposes of attaining an academic degree in other Italian or foreign 
universities. The candidate also declares that all the materials used during the preparation of 
the thesis have been explicitly indicated in the text and in the section "Bibliographical 
























Fighting or sustaining corruption network: the role 







INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 5 
CHAPTER I: Corruption as a global phenomenon ........................................................................... 7 
1.1 Definition and consequences of corruption ............................................................................... 7 
1.2 Main characteristics of corruption .......................................................................................... 10 
1.3 Supply-side and demand-side of corruption ........................................................................... 14 
1.4 The suggestions from national and international institutions ............................................... 17 
1.5 Focus on EU policies ................................................................................................................. 21 
CHAPTER II: The role of Accounting and Control Systems ......................................................... 24 
2.1 Role of Management Control Systems .................................................................................... 25 
2.2 The COSO Model ...................................................................................................................... 31 
2.3 Accounting as a system to prevent corruption ....................................................................... 36 
2.4 Evolution and characteristics of the Auditing process ........................................................... 40 
CHAPTER III: Structure and characteristics of Corruption Networks ....................................... 43 
3.1 General characteristics of a corruption network ................................................................... 43 
3.2 The role of accounting practice ................................................................................................ 48 
3.2.1 The Enron scandal: a failure of control systems ............................................................. 51 
3.3 Corruption networks in developing countries ........................................................................ 53 
3.3.1 Short-term financing and corruption networks: the example of China ........................ 54 
3.3.2 Patrimonial and clientelist patron-client networks ......................................................... 55 
3.3.3 Organization and social costs of corruption networks .................................................... 57 
CHAPTER IV: Italian MOSE and Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program scandals .... 60 
4.1 Study design ............................................................................................................................... 60 
4.2 Data and method ....................................................................................................................... 61 
4.3 MOSE scandal: an Italian example ......................................................................................... 62 
4 
 
4.3.1 History of MOSE scandal .................................................................................................. 62 
4.3.2 Protagonists of the scandal ................................................................................................ 64 
4.3.3 Role of accounting in the realization of the corruption network ................................... 67 
4.4 Sponsorship Program: a Canadian example .......................................................................... 70 
4.4.1 History of the Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program scandal ........................ 70 
4.4.2 Protagonists of the scandal ................................................................................................ 72 
4.4.3 Role of accounting in the realization of the corruption network ................................... 76 
4.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................... 85 



























The 2014 European Commission’s Anti-corruption Report defines corruption as “abuse of 
power for private gain” (European Commission, 2014, p. 2). The phenomenon’s estimated 
costs in the European Union alone are around €120 billion per year, an amount very close to 
the entire budget of the EU. The total amount is based on estimates by specialised institutions 
and bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, UN 
Global Compact, World Economic Forum, which also suggest that corruption amounts to 5% 
of GDP at world level (European Commission, 2014). 
The phenomenon has been increasing in parallel to the unprecedented growth of international 
trade during the past decades (Barkemeyer et al., 2015). In many developing countries that 
have been only recently involved in the globalization process, various forms of corruption are 
still considered the norm, in particular when governments have limited financial resources to 
invest in the enforcement of laws (Barkemeyer et al., 2015). In many countries and industries, 
corruption tends to be widely socially accepted, becoming harder and harder to identify and 
fight. 
 
Research shows that certain industries, independently from their geographical position, seem 
to be more exposed to corruption (for example healthcare, urban development and 
construction) while others, for the nature of the activities conducted, are in most cases 
relatively safer (European Commission, 2014). 
 
The IMF Guide Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption reports that 
“corruption thrives in the presence of excessive government regulation and intervention in the 
economy” (International Monetary Fund, 2002, p. 2), but empirical analysis shows that in 
developed and advanced nations there is no correlation between public expenditure and level 
of corruption. Corruption, anyway, seems to be positively correlated with the degree of 
regulation of business activity (Hopkin and Rodríguez‐Pose., 2007).  
Even in many EU Member States, internal controls across the country (in particular at local 
level) are considered weak and uncoordinated. According to the European Commission and 
its 2014 anti-corruption report, there is a need to reinforce such controls and match them with 




Complexity of legislation is also perceived as an obstacle to smooth operations. Frequent and 
incoherent legislative changes can generate legal uncertainty and weaknesses in the 
implementation process and corresponding control mechanism (European Commission, 
2014). 
 
Accounting and related control mechanisms play a fundamental role both in the prevention 
and detection of corruption within public bodies. In some cases, Courts of Audit have played 
a prominent proactive role in the fight against the phenomenon, pushing anti-corruption 
reforms forward. But in many cases, controls (in particular at a limited local level) can be 
ineffective and uncoordinated.  
In many environments, for the illegal nature of the phenomenon itself, corruption is informal 
and auditors, who need to work on well documented evidence, may be unable to fight and 
limit the phenomenon. Even when they are able to spot clear cases of corruption, auditors 
could be ineffective in case of well organised collusion between the involved parties 
(generally citizens and public functionaries) and for the lack of implementation of the 
regulations. 
More or less sophisticated corruption networks require the creation and development of cash 
flows and a careful management of financial resources and relationships between the 
individuals involved (Neu et al., 2013). Accounting can also provide the fundamental 
instruments to achieve sustainable and apparently legitimate results in extremely complex 
schemes. 
 
A comparison between different corruption scandals may give us a better understanding of the 
phenomenon and how different forms of corruption affect countries and industries, while 
observing and understanding the key characteristics and themes of corruption networks, 
presented in the other chapters of the work. 
Trial documents and commissions’ reports regarding two prominent examples of corruption 
network (the MOSE affair and the Canadian Government’s Sponsorship Program scandal) 
have been studied and compared in the last chapter of the work, analysing their key 
components, the role of accounting practice and their key common elements and differences, 
along with references to the themes presented throughout the rest of the thesis, to get a better 
understanding of the reasons behind the failure of the control systems and the challenges they 










Corruption has deeply changed during the past decades and it is a major key point in the 
agendas of most national and supranational institutions. To get a better understanding of 
corruption and related illegal networks and activities, it’s fundamental to study the evolution 
of the phenomenon and how its characteristics may vary across different industries and 
countries (United Nations, 2018). 
Only studying the major causes and consequences of this phenomenon (and its links with the 
private sector) institutions can promote an effective war against corruption through adequate 
control systems and regulations.  
However, because of the illegal and shady nature of corruption itself, the phenomenon is in 
many cases hard to study and understand; a well organised and coordinated series of 
provisions against corruption is still one of today’s greatest challenges for legislators around 
the world.  
 
 
1.1 Definition and consequences of corruption 
 
The general definition of corruption provided by the European Commission (2014, p. 2) is 
“any abuse of power for private gain”: many forms are clearly possible, in many cases in the 
relationship among public officials (which are the ones exploiting their privileged position) 
and private citizens or firms.  
Many other authors propose definitions of corruptive events. For example, Friedrich defined 
corruption as the situation in which “a responsible functionary or office holder is, by 
monetary or other rewards (...) induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
reward and thereby damage the group or organization to which the functionary belongs, more 
specifically the government” (1989, p. 15). Huntington defined corruption as “behaviour of 
public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends” (1989, p. 
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377) and Nye as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or  status gains; or violates rules 
against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (1989, p. 966). 
 
From these definitions the key characteristics of corruption emerge:  
 
• the phenomenon is often hidden and informal (and therefore can be very hard to detect 
and fight), even compared to other illegal activities; 
• the phenomenon requires a “supply side” and “demand side” interested in personal 
gains and ready to go against the law and sacrifice public interest. 
 
Spence (2017), as quoted by Mazzi et al. (2019), outlines five common features that 
characterise corruption episodes: 
1) possession of power; 
2) a disposition to exercise that power; 
3) an opportunity to exercise that power;  
4) invisibility or concealment; 
5) self-regarding gain (not necessarily financial). 
 
This definition summarizes every corruption phenomenon at its most basic and ubiquitous key 
elements. Culture seems to be a fundamental factor directly affecting the effectiveness of 
regulatory control practice too. 
 
Moreover, the terms “corruption” and “fraud” are in many cases used interchangeably, but 
according to a classification provided by Khan (2006), corruption takes place mainly in the 
forms of: 
- bribery (offering money or favours in order to illegally influence individuals in a 
position of trust and power); 
- kickbacks and commissions (when one of the involved parties pays back to the other a 
percentage of the illegally obtained capital gain); 
- other benefits (not necessarily financial rewards). 
 
Adopting one of these forms, the involved parties will try to avoid leaving traces of their 
transactions and relationships in the official records, keeping the deal as secret and unofficial 
as possible. This is also one of the main reasons why even when many honest public officials 
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perceive and denounce the existence of a corruption network, it could be very hard to identify 
and dismantle: lack of proofs and documentation can obstacle investigations and internal 
control systems.  
Instead, fraud is related to undue benefits obtained by bypassing controls and going against 
some regulations (using, for example, falsified information and certifications). For the nature 
of this activity, fraud tends to be more documented and easier to trace: the related auditing 
process is generally very different from corruption-related auditing.  
For these reasons, in this work we won’t consider corruption and fraud as synonymous.  
 
The losses caused by the spread of corruption amount to more than 5% of the world’s GDP 
(United Nations, 2018). These amounts are large enough to deeply affect the global economy 
and political policymaking, damaging welfare and public investments with significative 
consequences for hundreds of millions of people. 
As pointed out by the OECD in its Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement (2009, p. 
11), “Weak governance in public procurement hinders market competition and raises the price 
paid by the administration for goods and services, direct impacting public expenditures and, 
therefore, taxpayers’ resources. The financial interests at stake, and the close interaction 
between the public and private sectors, make public procurement a major risk area. […]”. 
 
Corruption works and prospers mostly modifying and destroying the flows of capitals, goods 
and services organised by governments: key resources are moved away from people or 
institutions who need them and end up under the control of individuals interested only in 
personal gains. The involvement of corporations interested in obtaining unfair business 
advantages is very common in major corruption-related scandals. 
 
The phenomenon has deeper and more devastating consequences in the developing world: 
funds that should be invested, promoting economic growth and development, are often 
diverted by corrupted officials for private gain, fuelling a vicious circle of inequality and 
inefficiencies. 
At the same time, poor people who are victims of corruption usually sacrifice larger 
percentages of their income to access basic fundamental public services (United Nations, 
2004). 
 
Endemic corruption inevitably generates economic underperformance in the medium-long 
term, not only destroying growth opportunities, but discouraging foreign investments and 
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effective government intervention. Corruption can seriously obstacle growth and 
competitiveness of entire countries and, in the most extreme cases, pushes populations deeper 
and deeper under extremists’ control, underlining the potential role of the United Nations in 
supporting Member States in the fight against corruption: a more efficient involvement and an 
expansion of public participation, in particular with the use of new technologies, could 
increase accountability and limit extremism.  
Past years’ deadliest conflicts in the African continent have offered enormous opportunities 
for illicit self-enrichment (as inevitably happens during war economies), with a very clear 
nexus between corruption and war atrocities (United Nations, 2018). 
 
Even if there is “not a country in the world which does not treat bribery as criminal on its 
lawbooks” (Noonan, 1984, p. 702), the phenomenon is now more relevant and discussed than 
ever. 
Noonan, in his book Bribes (1984), shows that bribery is condemned in every culture and 
considered “shameful”, being a betrayal of the trust of the public. However, corruption in 
many cases is also seen as a possible and effective solution to failures of the markets and of 
politics; for this reason, effective and improved systems (with deeply structured changes) are 
in most cases the best way to fight corruption. 
 
 
1.2 Main characteristics of corruption  
 
Corruption as a worldwide phenomenon has evolved and changed deeply during the past 
decades but it is still widespread around the world (United Nations, 2018). Because of its 
structural complexity and its economic, social, political and cultural dimensions, a war on 
corruption cannot be easily planned, as there isn’t one definitive set of measures or policies 
which could effectively limit corruption worldwide. 
 
The different settings are characterized by specific political processes and institutional 
structures which inevitably form different kinds of corruption. 
 
Companies with different sizes and from different sectors will inevitably require different 
approaches, but distinct backgrounds will also affect deeply the control system. 
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Different backgrounds (with different cultures, history and politics) will shape different 
concepts of management and control systems: a general, universally accepted system is 
impossible to define, especially considering the myriads of specific characteristics which 
contribute to the uniqueness of each single firm (Hofstede, 2010).  
The level of decentralization and related autonomy of the firm’s branches also have a 
fundamental role in shaping the financial structure of the organization (including the profit-
sharing system) and the entire management strategy. Cultural differences and national limits 
can seriously damage the “exportation” of successful management ideas and organization 
strategies, but in many studies this fundamental assumption is underrated or not considered at 
all. The behaviour of managers, board of directors and leaders around the world is inevitably 
going to be affected by the characteristics of their societies, not exclusively by their business 
environment. 
For decades, for example, U.S. models have been considered a key to success and growth: 
theories supported by the predominant role of American editors, that for decades have been 
publishing mostly American articles in their management journals. The success of American 
economy, in fact, is related to an historical context and other factors which can be impossible 
to reply in other countries. 
 
Johnston (2005) proposes a fundamental distinction between different institutional settings, 
which are influenced by context-specific factors like forms of political participation and 
control systems: 
1) Influence-Market, 
2) Elite Cartel, 
3) Oligarch and Clan, 
4) Official Mogul. 
 
In “Influence-Market” countries (like Canada, USA and Japan), briberies are not very 
common because they are discouraged by solid institutional structure: direct bribing is 
avoided, but at the same time more complex and sophisticated forms of corruption are 
encouraged and certain forms of hidden corruption become more and more inevitable, in 
particular when the costs of democratic processes are so high that can become unsustainable 
without the investments (and related influence) of the private sector. Lobbying practices have 
become widespread and mostly accepted in particular in countries like United States and 
Canada, where political parties can’t possibly sustain costs without resource inflows and 
raising funds is a key factor for successful campaigns (Neu et al., 2013).  
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In “Elite Cartels” settings, state institutions are not as strong and corruption networks 
involving colluding elites are more common and harder to control and fight (South Korea and 
Botswana are possible examples). 
“Oligarchs and Clans” settings present even weaker state institutions, generally controlled by 
extremely corrupt elites through bribing and even violence against political opposition. In the 
most extreme cases, public and private sectors are deeply connected and both under the elite’s 
influence (Russia, Philippines and Mexico are possible examples). 
In case of “Official Moguls”, even smaller groups or powerful individuals are free to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the state, often with total impunity. Anti-corruption 
organizations are generally very weak and political opposition is often forbidden or 
persecuted. (China and Kenya are reported as possible examples). 
The structure of the political system itself is fundamental too: more rigorous separation of 
public powers (legislature, executive, judiciary) might help to diminish corruption (Johnston, 
2012). 
 
This distinction between institutional settings provides a general description of common 
settings around the world, but certain forms of corruption are globally diffused, and no nation 
can be completely described by a simple model, especially considering that transitions from 
one kind of model to another are always possible in the medium-long term. (Johnston, 2012). 
Political decisions related to key elements like healthcare, taxation and environment can 
severely impact even the world’s biggest corporations, creating an inevitable interdependence 
between politics and business.  
This interdependence in some cases can be mutually beneficial, but needs to be heavily 
regulated to protect the best interest of the population and avoid money-grabbing schemes 
from the involved parties (Johnston, 2005). 
 
Even if petty corruption is less reported and even less visible than billion dollars corruption 
scandals, it can still deeply damage entire economies, in particular if these small cases are part 
of a phenomenon where millions of minor illegal payments are made and especially in an 
environment where bribes become socially accepted and authorities are incapable of handling 
the problem (United Nations, 2018). 
 
During the past decades, governments and supranational institutions have invested many 
resources trying to understand and stop the many forms of the phenomenon and studying 
possible solutions and identifying “red flags”. 
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In 2002, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) published a list of 
common indicators which internal auditors should consider to estimate possible risks of 
corruption. If these indicators of transparency and accountability aren’t followed by the 
organization, there is a higher risk of corruption and other illegal activities: 
 
• the organizational environment fosters control consciousness; 
• realistic organizational goals and objectives are set; 
• written policies (for example, a code of conduct) exist that describe prohibited activities and 
the action required whenever violations are discovered; 
• appropriate authorization policies for transactions are established and maintained; 
• policies, practices, procedures, reports, and other mechanisms are developed to monitor 
activities and safeguard assets, particularly in high risk areas; 
• communication channels provide management with adequate and reliable information; 
• recommendations need to be made for the establishment or enhancement of cost-effective 
controls to help deter fraud. 
 
The list of requirements can be easily adapted to many different settings and situations, 
independently from the size, governance and level of internationalization of the firms, 
allowing control systems to identify immediately riskier cases. 
The World Bank adopted a new Governance and Anticorruption strategy in 2007 too; 
identifying red flags, institutions can learn from past experiences, recognizing and stopping 
cases of corruption earlier and more efficiently (Ferwerda et al., 2016).  
 
It’s also fundamental to consider that most of the literature adopting risk indicators to estimate 
and predict illegal behaviours is inevitably affected by estimation bias: this kind of 
measurement is, for its nature, unpredictable and inaccurate. Many statistics related to 
corruption and other illegal activities are mostly based on estimates and a full and deep 
understanding of corruption networks could be impossible to achieve. People directly 
involved in a corruption network are interested in keeping it as secret as possible and 
investigating it tends to undermine people’s trust in government activities and it’s in some 
cases discouraged (United Nations, 2004). 
Corruption inevitably flourishes when a key product or service is controlled by a monopoly 
that determines its distribution and amounts (Klitgaard, 2011).  Concentration of vital 
products and services in the hands of a limited number of key players should be avoided and 




When regional and local authorities have wide discretionary powers in the matter of public 
procurements, there is a higher risk of undetected corruption, in particular in case of limited 
checks from control mechanisms (Ferwerda et al., 2016). In the most extreme cases, the 
consolidation of local “clientele networks” presented also relationships with organised crime, 




1.3 Supply-side and demand-side of corruption 
 
It’s also fundamental to consider that corrupt transactions generally involve a “supply side” 
(the payer of a bribe) and a “demand side” (the recipient of the bribe) and both sides need to 
be monitored to stop the phenomenon.  
 
Most of the regulations adopted to stop corruption are devoted to the planning and 
implementation of internal controls of government officials, obscuring the so called “supply 
side” of the corruption phenomenon: the corporations providing goods and services for the 
government departments (Sikka & Lehman, 2015). While the state can and will check on its 
own functionaries, it is generally excluded from the internal processes of the corporations it is 
working with; the state’s possibilities to accurately monitor the firms and enforce internal 
controls are generally limited and are responsibility of the firm’s executives. 
 
Governments tend to be the centre of institutional attention regarding corrupt practices, but 
it’s also important to consider that in the modern world many corporations have revenues 
bigger than the GDP of entire nations, with a huge variety of subsidiaries and affiliates around 
the world. A big and complex network can allow them to camouflage easily their activities to 
gain extra profits. In many cases, corporations have shown to be ready to subvert regulations 
and internal control systems to gain competitive advantage, operating according to the laws of 
private profit (Chatterjee, 2009).  
A clear red flag for corruption is conflict of interest (due to family, business or political 
relationships) or possible impartiality of the tender provider to determined suppliers because 




Regular punishments don’t seem to discourage corporations’ illegal activities, in particular in 
certain industries; corporations are more and more under pressure because of shareholders’ 
demands and competition, so they are de facto encouraged to use illicit means to achieve 
faster and better results.  
The main reasons why corporations may be interested in engaging in corrupt practices are 
1) to maintain higher prices; 
2) to maintain a market for obsolete products or services; 
3) to remain in the field of competition. 
 
These practices may generate unfair competition in the market and incessant pressures for 
higher sales, profits and market shares (Moody-Stuart, 1997). 
Once a hidden illegal network is successfully initiated, it can become substantial part of the 
official institutionalized practices: corruption gradually becomes harder and harder to detect 
and stop. Networks of professionals involved in the same activities could be vulnerable to a 
collectively accepted lowering of regulatory vigilance (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). 
 
Research has identified a series of red flags (indicators of high risk of corruption) mostly in 
public procurement, defined as “the process by which governments as well as other bodies 
governed by public law purchase products, services and public works” (European 
Commission, 2015, p. 2).  
Considering that, always according to the European Commission (2015), 250,000 public 
authorities in the EU have to spend 18% of GDP to purchase services, works and supplies, it’s 
clear why corruption in this area is so relevant: controlling a limited number of public 
officials in key positions, corruptors may be able to gain access to enormous capital flows and 
opportunities. 
 
Ware, Moss and Campos (2007) propose four fundamental procurement stages along which 
corruption can be organized, based on the investigations of cases of corruption: 
1) project identification and design; 
2) advertising, prequalification, bid preparation and submission; 
3) bid evaluation, post qualification and award of contract; 




Underperforming firms tend to be more involved in illegal activities, in particular when it’s 
the only possible way to survive, while high-performing firms have clearly less incentives to 
do so. 
 
CEO compensations and the structure of the board of directors (with related accounting 
procedures, reward systems and human resource practices) are considered other possible 
causes of episodes of corruption and other illegal procedures, mostly related to the incentive 
system (stock options, bonuses...), very common and well affirmed among corporations. 
Size, complexity and division of labour can also deeply affect corporation’s behaviour: in 
case of decentralized decision processes, opportunities for concealment are more common and 
the risk of getting caught is lower.  
Coffee (2005) proposes a fundamental distinction between American and European illegal 
activities: radical differences related to the different ownership and governance system. In 
fact, European corporations tend to be controlled by smaller ownerships and usually are less 
decentralised. The fundamental role of organizational culture and institutions, anyway, 
shouldn’t be underestimated and can deeply affect very different realities. 
 
Growth and related costs of developments can also be correlated with corruption, but the 
internationalization process generally expose firms to an increasing number of regulations and 
procedures which could damage or even destroy domestic corruption network (Sandholtz & 
Gray, 2003). Overall, international trade in many cases improves transparency and 
accountability among corporation executives.  
 
Evidences of the effects of corruption can be found in every part of the financial statements. 
According to a study by Mazzi at al. (2019), in countries with higher levels of corruption, 
capitalized development costs will be less effective at increasing future earnings, compared to 
similar situations and expenditures in countries with low levels of corruption, in many cases 
with reduction of abnormal returns even in the short term. In high corruption environments, 
efficiency is sacrificed and in many cases sub-optimal allocation of resources becomes 
inevitable, damaging the entire market. 
Another fundamental factor explaining the correlation between country-level corruption and 
amount of development costs capitalized is given by the fundamental differences in 
accounting standards, which may vary in the countries where the firm operates. While IFRS 
prescribe that development costs need to be capitalized if certain criteria are met, IAS 38 
impose restrictive conditions to reduce the related managerial opportunism. 
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This inevitably affects stock returns and dividends as well, influencing stock prices: fighting 
corruption in many cases is also in the best interest of shareholders. 
 
In more individualistic countries, where intense competition for prestige, status, and material 
wealth, individuals seem more likely to seek special favours to gain advantages over others 
for personal gain (Khatri, Tsang, & Begley, 2006). 
 
Elaborate  and sophisticated corruption networks resemble organized crime in the most 
extreme and elaborate cases. As seen inside criminal organizations, in presence of systemic 
corruption is possible to find real systems of recruitment, hierarchies and even rewards and 
punishments for the involved parties. 
The greater the number of parties involved, the greater the risk of getting caught, but also the 
potential profit (in particular if the cash flows are properly managed and masked as legit 
activities). 
Studies have shown that in many cases, public employees, for the characteristics of their 
occupation, are the leaders of these corruption networks (Khan, 2006). 
It’s also important to consider that the most successful and durable corruption networks are 
those in which bribing offers sufficient gains to both the corruptor and the corrupted: the 





1.4 The suggestions from national and international institutions 
 
 
Transparency and accountability are the key words of the war of national and international 
institutions (like United Nations, European Union, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund...) against corruption (United Nations, 2018); these institutions have different roles, 
influence and authority in diverse areas. Even if international institutions can’t replace the 
fundamental role of national governments, they can still provide a series of principles and 
guidelines, which can be eventually received and adopted by national legislators.  
A good level of transparency should allow full publicity of institutional activities and public 
access to all the information that may improve competition and avoid illegal collusions 
(Manganaro, 2009). Some of the most important suggested measures from the UN convention 
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against corruption are related to transparency: members of the general public should be 
allowed to obtain information about the activity of public administrations and, at the same 
time, periodic reports on corruption should be published and administrative procedures should 
be made more transparent and easier to access.  
 
Allowed levels of transparency should be clearly regulated and the information available 
thanks to the fundamental principles of publicity and public access should also be presented in 
an understandable way for the interested involved parties, even simplifying, if necessary, 
administrative language and formality. The complexity of most bureaucratic procedures, 
anyway, can inevitably obstacle effective flows of information from institutions to the 
population; this complexity may vary significantly among different countries and different 
processes too. 
 
Accountability is also fundamental to keep records and traces of financial transactions, 
identifying the responsibilities of private firms and public officials while valuing the 
effectiveness of their activities.  
The level of accountability can vary significantly between different countries and, when 
related to private firms, it’s deeply influenced by the size and by the level of 
internationalization of the observed firm (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). 
 
Most supranational organizations, including World Bank, strongly support decentralization of 
local government, in particular in the developing world; decentralization combined with a 
more direct local democracy may be easier to monitor and, in case of criminal behaviour, 
replace public officials. 
Government officials refusing to introduce adequate reforms or to improve transparency and 
accountability in many cases will be removed from office, so politicians will likely try to 
introduce anti-corruption policies if they want to be elected.  
On a more local perspective, common problems like information asymmetry and lack of 
information should be less relevant and easier to overcome, compared to a very centralized 
government. 
 
Decentralization must be supported by good quality of accounting practices (and all the other 
anti-corruption strategies should be complementary as well) to achieve better results, a 
combination that can be very hard to obtain, in particular in poor countries. Decentralization 
is a very complex process and models working well in some countries may not be as effective 
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in other environments: for these reasons, decentralization combined with weak quality 
accounting practices may have negative consequences, in particular if combined with 
environments with low levels of transparency and press freedom (Changwony & Paterson, 
2019). 
 
Governance is defined by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009, p. 5) as “… the traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes a process by which 
governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state 
for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”; combined with 
good quality institutions, a good system of governance is fundamental to sustain growth and a 
well-functioning financial system. If the quality of governance is unsatisfactory, it has to be 
improved or even replaced following the regulated procedures.  
 
A research by Hooper et al. (2009) has shown a significant and positive relationship between 
positive stock market performance and good quality governance (with adequate levels of 
transparency, accountability and effectiveness); to get a better understanding of the 
phenomenon, anyway, quality of governance and financial market stability and related 
indicators should be considered and studied together. Sherif and Chen (2019) studied the 
relationship between institutional governance factors and abnormal momentum stock returns, 
collecting the data related to governance from previous researches of the World Bank. They 
found a significative correlation between low levels of corruption and governance 
effectiveness: without corruption, most operations are going to be smoother and more 
efficient in delivering the required goods or services, granting better economic results.  
 
Accounting has a fundamental role in providing vital information and fight corruption: 
without a good quality accounting system, other anti-corruption practices could be ineffective 
as well. 
At the same time, however, local bureaucrats may be victims of pressing demands from 
corporations or local elites, in particular in developing countries where this kind of 
phenomenon is still extremely common. 
The fundamental correlation between corruption, decentralization and accounting practices is 
one of the most important themes in corruption literature (Changwony & Paterson, 2019) and 





Another strategy is related to privatization policies. The implementation of this kind of 
measures is not always easy or even possible in many cases and many policies may have other 
negative consequences (as historically seen in case of extreme privatization, for example), in 
particular if complementary measures aren’t implemented; in poor countries, effective 
development measures can also have a fundamental role. 
Judicial and repressive measures can also have a major role in fighting the phenomenon and 
limiting criminal organization and systemic corruption. Brunetti and Weder (2003) also show 
a significative correlation between free press and low corruption. 
 
Governments can demand better quality internal controls introducing new laws, requirements 
and punishments, but in a globalized and interconnected economy this kind of provisions 
could become more and more ineffective if states don’t cooperate through enforcement of 
international laws and treaties. Periodic fines are common and seem to be easily accepted in 
many industries, signalling that in many cases punishments from the state are not a sufficient 
deterrent, even when executives are perfectly aware of the consequences of their illegal 
actions. 
A program of deschooling, against the current failures of education on the subject (Illich, 
1974), with additional improvements in corporate culture to change the perception of 
corruption and other illegal activities among executives, promoting transparency and more 
socially conscious behaviours. 
 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are the real protagonist in promoting accountability among 
governments and prevent corruption. Considered the independent watchdogs of public 
interest, SAIs are putting an increasing focus on ethics in the public service and cost 
effectiveness while promoting accountability and transparency among governments (Dye & 
Stapenhurst, 1998).  
To achieve good results, SAIs should receive adequate funding and well-trained staff, sharing 
data and experience with other institutions, promoting a free and efficient flow of information. 
At the same time SAIs need to remain independent from the executive, to avoid external 







1.5 Focus on EU policies 
 
The European Union Commission (2014) sustains that a “mutual experience-sharing 
program” could help Member States in the identification of best practices to overcome error 
and problems in anti-corruption policies. Feedbacks from the directly involved stakeholders 
may help to understand possible gaps and errors in policies too. 
 
According to the results from two “Eurobarometer surveys” carried out in early 2013, the 
ranking reported in the CPI index published by Transparency International tends to 
correspond to the Eurobarometer’s results. Being the result based also on perception, a 
relatively high perception of corruption as a common phenomenon doesn’t always correspond 
to an high number of people who say that effectively had to pay briberies. In countries like 
Belgium, Estonia, France and Germany, for example, more than fifty percent of the 
respondents claim that corruption in their own country is widespread, but only 2% really had 
to pay a bribe. 
Perception of corruption can be deeply affected also by media coverage and significative 
political or financial scandals, causing an inaccurate vision of the phenomenon. Always 
according to the Eurobarometer, 26 % of Europeans affirm to be personally affected by 
corruption and 76% of them think that corruption is a widespread phenomenon in their 
country. Only 8% of Europeans, anyway, affirm to have experienced or witnessed a case of 
corruption in the previous 12 months. 
A business-focused Flash survey shows radical variations among Member States: while in 
Greece the level of perceived corruption is 99%, in Denmark it’s just 10%. From a business-
focused point of view, 4 out of 10 companies at European level consider corruption to be a 
potential problem for business activities. The smaller the company, the higher is the risk of 
facing problems related to corruption and nepotism. 
 
Anti-corruption policies, in the past years, have become priorities in many European states, in 
particular after the terrible economic consequences and the scandals of the financial crisis 
(European Commission, 2014). People all round the world are protesting, demanding more 
transparency and more accountability for political and financial elites, which even in 
democratic countries in many cases are not trusted at all: codes of conduct for parties and 
corporations, when present, generally lack of adequate control systems. One of the most 
important topics is related to the financing of public parties (further discussed in the fourth 
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chapter): after recent scandals, several Member States have implemented new policies to 
improve transparency on financing and donations for public parties.  
 
 
New policies alone, in many cases, are not enough to reach significative and tangible 
improvements; coordination and additional strategies for an effective implementation are 
generally required. 
Asset disclosure for officials in many cases helps to achieve more transparency and 
accountability among public officials. The approaches change according to the required 
amount of information to be disclosed; in the past decades the requirements have become 
stricter and stricter even in Member States where initially disclosure wasn’t required. In a few 
Member States, in fact, institutions in charge of monitoring and checking asset disclosure 
have limited powers and in the most extreme cases asset disclosure wasn’t applied at all; even 
right now, related control systems can be very ineffective because of excessive complexity or 
lack of independence from governments.  
 
In the European Union, it is for the Member State alone to decide which institutional structure 
should be focused on fighting corruption in its own territory. 
Setting up specialised anti-corruption agencies, active in many Member States, isn’t clearly a 
solution to all problems. 
The result obtained by these agencies vary according to factors like effective independence 
from political interference, cooperation with other institutions and provision of necessary 
resources and skills; these important requirements obviously aren’t respected in every 
condition and in every Member State and in many case a proper coordination with other 
agencies and the judicial system is missing too. 
If an anti-corruption agency isn’t independent from politics, for example, the risk of direct or 
indirect pressure from the latter may seriously obstacle the agency’s procedures and 
legitimacy.  
 
Independence of the judiciary system, for the same reasons, is also a fundamental element of 
every anti-corruption policy and of an overall well-functioning framework (European 
Commission, 2014).  
Another obstacle is related to the excessive length of judicial procedures: delays can be 
extremely costly and benefit people involved in illegal activities, which in some cases can 
even avoid the finalisation of the court proceedings. Political interference in corruption cases 
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is still very common even in some European countries and in many cases the powers of anti-
corruption agencies themselves aren’t matched with adequate levels of accountability.  
 
The most vulnerable sectors are generally the same in every Member State (and outside EU as 
well). 
Urban development and construction are sectors where corruption is traditionally high and 
even higher in Member States where businesses tend to be directly more affected by the 
corruption phenomenon. Environmental planning, in particular, has been pinpointed as an 
extremely exposed sector because of the sector’s connections with illegal party funding 
related with granting of planning permits. 
Most of the Member States deeply and constantly affected by the phenomenon haven’t started 
a sector-specific strategy to tackle corruption episodes, which could be more effective than a 
broad and generic anti-corruption strategy. 
 
Transparency policies and freedom of information should be one of the priority of the EU in 
the fight against corruption, but at the same time the Member States must be ready to protect 
whistle-blowers from retaliation and promote “transparency of lobbying”, making relationship 






















National and international public institutions are protagonists of the global fight against 
corruption, but also the single organizations need to be able to detect and stop illegal activities 
within their sphere of influence. Accounting practices and related control systems are among 
the most important protagonists of this fight, but their roles can deeply change according to 
the needs of the actors adopting them. 
According to a definition of Ahrens (2009, p. 31), “from a practice perspective accounting is 
an array of activities that is ordered by practical understandings, rules, and objectives and 
projects, and that forms a nexus of practices together with management and control practices, 
commercial practices, reporting practices, bookkeeping practices and suchlike”. The 
definition underlines the inevitable variability of accounting, seen as a set of instruments 
which can be adopted by different users for different purposes, in some cases illegal activities.  
Ahrens also emphasizes the fundamental role of practice (or, to be more precise, of the 
combinations of different practices) in the realization of reliable and efficient networks: 
practice should gradually improve through the accomplishments and strategies of the actors 
involved as a process in continuous evolution, avoiding simple repetitions.  
Control systems aren’t always mandatory by law, but any firm could benefit from an effective 
implementation of internal control systems (especially in environments and industries where 
corruption can seriously damage the firm’s performance), in particular if there is an efficient 
cooperation between different control strategies, both internal and external.  
Without an adequate planning and anti-corruption internal strategy, the organization’s 
employees may decide to act for personal gain, getting directly or indirectly involved in 
corruption networks; regulations and bureaucracy on the subject shouldn’t just impose a set of 
rules, but they must try to understand the employees’ needs and anticipate their reactions to be 
really effective.  
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Different countries and different industries generate inevitably different organizations, which 
require distinct approaches to  internal control systems: the role of accounting (in particular in 
the developed world) is fundamental to promote transparency and accountability of the parties 
involved in financial transactions, but in many cases it isn’t enough to stop the realization of 
corruption networks.  
Widely accepted accounting standards and good quality financial reporting are precious and 
effective tools to identify bribery and small corruption networks, but in certain environments 
they could help to legitimate and sustain corruption networks and related illegal transactions.     
 
 
2.1 Role of Management Control Systems 
 
According to Malmi and Brown (2008), the concept of Management and Control Systems 
(MCS) is related to the implementation of the company’s strategy, interconnected with 
monitoring activities and information flow, to detect and solve a wide range of problems 
while boosting performance. Other key objectives of the system are the coordination and 
optimization of interactions between human resources, organizational structure and 
management. 
However, the same authors sustain that literature on the topic doesn’t provide a clear and 
unique definition of MCS, especially considering how quickly it changes overtime and the 
significant differences of MCS depending on the characteristics of the firms considered. 
The fundamental elements of every MCS are (Borsa Italiana, 2014): 
• a clear set of planning and control activities to monitor the performances of the firm 
(for example through SWOT analysis, benchmarking and value chain analysis); 
• a set of technical-accounting tools, to accurately process information and provide 
support to the decision-making processes (like budgeting system, reporting system and 
analytical accounts); 
• a well-integrated information system, to disclose effectively the information (after a 




Combining the results obtained through these instruments, corporations can identify the 
fundamental key success factors they need to survive and grow; being so important and 
interconnected, they also need to be constantly monitored to detect and stop possible risk 
factors, anticipating and preventing possible negative scenarios. 
Business-related risks can seriously compromise the profitability of the firm, management 
must be ready to identify and understand (Borsa Italiana, 2014): 
• external risks, generated by the alteration of an external factor (from the inevitable 
risks associated with competitors to the risks of global recessions and disruptive 
technological innovations), generally harder to predict and control; 
 
• internal risks, which could be:  
 
I. process risks, with a focus on the ability of the organization 
to improve the continuity of the fundamental operating 
processes, promoting an efficient use of assets and 
availability of resources (fighting risks related to inadequate 
production capacity and improper handling of financial 
resources); 
 
II. information management risks, related to the efficient use of 
information needed for developing and improving corporate 
strategy (management needs to fight risks associated with an 
inefficient flow of information, which can compromise 
activities of performance analysis and forecasting). 
 
Managers and leaders can use several methods to control and prevent corruption inside their 
organization and their role is complementary to the anti-corruption activities conducted by 
public institutions. The managers’ monitoring strategies can be effective only if they are 
trusted by the public and if they are following specific ethic values; it can’t always be granted 
and in most sensitive environments an additional “monitor to monitor the monitor” may be 
required. 
As Lange reports in his research (2008), these approaches can be very different depending on 
the firm’s specific characteristics and the results of the implemented strategies are often 
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studied independently and without proper comparisons, generating high risks of 
misinterpretation and lack of basic understandings of context of firms’ activities. 
Nevertheless, organizations tend to be “isomorphic” with their own environment (Di Maggio 
and Powell, 1983) and generally develop common traits for three main reasons: 
• coercive pressure, related to the social pressure to follow existing social norms and 
procedures, not necessarily mandatory by law, for example in case of expectations 
from the media to address certain problems (including corruption); 
• normative pressure, more common when there is an accurate codification and set of 
norms that organizations need to follow to conduct certain activities. This 
phenomenon is much more relevant in heavily regulated industries; 
• mimetic pressure, related to the imitation of other organizations belonging to the same 
environment, to appear legitimate and gain recognition from stakeholders. 
 
According to a definition by Cardinal (2001, p. 22), “any process by which managers direct 
attention, motivate, and encourage organizational members to act in desired ways to meet the 
firm’s objectives” can be considered part of organizational control; the objective of the firm is 
fighting any opportunistic and deviant behaviour going against the organization’s activities, 
not only corruption. While corruption control is exclusively focused on the “minimization of 
an undesirable state” (Lange, 2008, p. 713), MCS are also focused on the improvement of 
cooperation and efficiency, with additional benefits. Corruption control needs to consider the 
different types of corruption to identify best possible solutions and must be distinguished 
from other kinds of organizational controls.  
Some of the MCS strategies can be more effective if they are combined in the same 
organization: managers inevitably need to get a better understanding of the intercorrelation 
between different approaches to build more effective strategies, avoiding inconsistent 
implementations. Control approaches based on bureaucratic restrictions, for example, could 
be inconsistent or even contradictory with approaches based on encouraging ethical behaviour 
among employees.  
 
According to Lange (2008), the different corruption control strategies adopted by firms can be 
schematized considering two fundamental distinctions. 
The first one is between controls based on final outcomes and controls oriented toward 
processes. In both cases the number one priority is the limitation of the risks related to the 
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agency problem, ensuring that employees are always working in the organization’s best 
interest and not exclusively for personal gain. This task can be particularly challenging if the 
firm’s hierarchy is complex and managers are significantly independent from the board of 
directors and have great decision-making autonomy. The organization can try to gain more 
control through: 
• outcome-oriented methods, through which managers try to punish or reward certain 
behaviours (generally recurring to economic or disciplinary incentives) trying to align the 
interest of managers with the interests of shareholders to avoid undesired consequences, 
while detecting and eliminating possible cases of corruption;   
• process-oriented controls, which inevitably involve active interventions before and 
during the employees’ activities. This type of controls requires ongoing monitoring 
activities at different levels of the organization, which are inevitably more expensive to 
implement than simpler outcome-oriented strategies.  
 
The second essential dichotomy is related to the adopted means of transmission, with a 
distinction between controls transmitted through administrative channels and controls 
transmitted through ethical, social or cultural channels: 
• social/cultural controls are deeply connected to the beliefs and values of every 
organization. They operate through the forces of social obligation, relying on fear of 
being judged and criticized by peers in case of corrupt behaviour; 
• administrative controls, instead, are transmitted using formal and official structures 
promoted by authorities inside and outside the organization, which operate through 
coercion and punishments. Differently from social controls, which tend to emerge 
unintentionally through routine and repeated interactions, administrative controls are 
intentionally designed for their role; both control systems, anyway, can still be 
manipulated by managers for personal gain and they aren’t sufficient to fully prevent 
corruption. 
 
Using these fundamental components, we can build a conceptual framework combining 




Figure 2.1 - Matrix of Corruption Control Dimensions-Orientation 
 
 Source: Lange (2008) 
 
According to Lange (2008) there are four main dominant functions offered by these 
approaches: 
1) autonomy reduction, in which the organization limits the employees’ freedom; 
2) consequence systems, in which the organization decides to punish and reward certain 
actions; 
3) environmental sanctioning, in which the organization interprets external regulatory 
pressures and informs the employees about their obligations;  
4) intrinsically oriented controls, in which the organization encourage the member’s own 
inclinations to detect and fight corruption (mostly theoretical and inevitably very challenging 
to implement in the real world).  
Combining the previous 2x2 matrix with the functionality of corruption control types, we 
obtain a more detailed framework which show eight different (but interlinked) corruption 





Figure 2.2 - Organizational Corruption Control Circumplex 
 
Source: Lange (2008) 
Looking at the Quadrant I, it’s clear that autonomy reduction procedures can be both rooted in 
regulations and bureaucratic strategies and in social obligation. 
Internal consequence systems, both incentives and punishments, are included in the Quadrant 
II and are located in the administrative part of the framework, being an important part of the 
organization’s administrative structure and authority. 
In Quadrant III, the organization is a sort of intermediary, in charge of transmitting 
information about legal and social sanctions to the employees. 
Quadrant IV, instead, contains the social influences within the organization that affect the 
employees’ attitude about illegal and corrupt behaviour.  
This model shows the main differences between corruption control systems and their main 
effects, but it can also provide information about possible combinations of these strategies.  
The model allows us to get also a better understanding of the fundamental role of bureaucracy 
in organizational control: being an inevitable component of formalized procedures and 
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regulations, bureaucratic control is adopted by most big organizations (Cardinal, 2001). 
Managers need to be able to successfully combine bureaucracy with the other control types 
presented in the framework. 
Some control types can coexist in the same environment, but friction and conflict are possible 
in case of control types sharing the same functionalities, in particular if they try to reach the 
same results in very different ways (Lange, 2008). Bureaucratic and punishment-related 
control types are still the most popular among managers trying to fight corruption, but the 
reactions of the employees involved in the control system need to be anticipated and 
understood to implement a successful model. 
Attitudes and outcomes may vary significantly if individuals are directly involved in the 
process (promoting empowerment and autonomy) or if they are just forced to follow passively 
a specific set of rules and bureaucratic procedures. 
Applying this model, anyway, it’s important to consider the significative differences between 
organizational contexts: different organizational flexibility, the adoption of organic or 
mechanistic contexts or the level of task predictability may deeply effectiveness and the costs 
of implementation of control systems. Most organizations are going to adopt more than one 
control type and the implementation of different strategies isn’t always part of a well-
structured plan, but often they just develop overtime alongside with the evolution of the 
organization’s activities.  
Future trends that will probably affect the evolution of MCS are going to be related to recent 
technologies and themes like the proliferation of data, artificial intelligence and automation, 
combined with the realization of stronger organizations and a better management of the costs 
of risk management. 
 
 
2.2 The COSO Model 
 
For decades, international institutions have been studying corruption and the way it affects 
companies’ activities, identifying possible models to control and fight the phenomenon. 
The main purpose of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) is providing strategies for the development of comprehensive 
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frameworks and guidance related to internal controls, fraud deterrence and enterprise risk 
management. Criteria adopted need to be reasonable and allow management to easily check 
the effectiveness of control systems. It’s a private initiative sponsored by five non-profit 
organizations, mainly focused on teaching, research and development of accounting-related 
strategies: 
• American Accounting Association; 
• American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; 
• Financial Executives International; 
• Institute of Management Accountants; 
• The Institute of Internal Auditors. 
 
The Internal Control- Integrated Framework was originally defined by COSO in 1992, 
gaining recognition by the organizations involved, it has become widely adopted by American 
public-traded companies subject to Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 404 compliance 
requirements (McNally, 2013).  
The COSO model has been updated in 2004, 2013 and 2017, in two decades new and 
different risks have become more and more relevant: risk needs to be considered both in the 
strategy-setting process and in driving performance. In the updated version have been 
presented additional ways to handle risk in a more complex business environment and in a 
more globalized and interconnected world economy. The transition from one version to 
another of the model can be summarized by a five-step process: 
1) develop awareness, expertise and alignment; 
2) conduct Preliminary Impact Assessment; 
3) facilitate Broad Awareness, Training, and Comprehensive Assessment; 
4) develop and Execute COSO Transition Plan for SOX Compliance; 
5) drive Continuous Improvement. 
 
Dealing with many different kinds of risk is a fundamental part of the decision-making 
process and, even if many practices related to risk management have developed over the past 
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decades, many economic activities are facing increasing levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The continuous change of regulations can be particularly challenging and affect the key 
principles and guidelines of the model: the companies themselves should do their part 
updating and improving their own control systems.  
 Enterprise risk management shouldn’t be considered a function of a single department, but a 
series of practices that need to become part of the firm’s culture and structure; it must address 
also the relationships with stakeholders and governance, without being focused exclusively on 
internal control and performance measurement (COSO, 2017). At the same time, stakeholders 
are getting more and more involved in the firms’ activities and tend to demand greater 
transparency and accountability from management and board of directors. 
Integrating properly enterprise risk management in their activities, firms may be able to: 
• increase their range of opportunities, as management could be more focused on current 
possibilities offered by the market; 
• identify and manage risk entity-wide, facing compactly the myriad of risks that can 
affect the different parts of the organizations; 
• reduce performance variability, when the risk is not necessarily related to unexpected 
losses but also to the variability of performance, enterprise risk management allows 
organizations to anticipate possible risk; 
• increase positive outcomes and advantages while reducing negative surprises, with a 
better allocation of resources to cover unexpected costs and losses; 
• enhancing enterprise resilience, as firms need to anticipate changes with a proactive 
approach. 























Source: McNelly (2013) 
 
Operations, reporting and compliance are considered the three main categories of objectives, 
while control environment, risk assessment etc. are the related components of internal control.  
Being “customizable” for very different kinds of organizations, the framework can be adapted 
according to the organization’s breeches under control (any entity, division, operating unit or 
even function of the firm) which will inevitably require different approaches. 
 
The focus on risk can be distinguished in four fundamental subgroups (Jeppesen, 2018):  
1) strategic risk: it deals with the risk related to business decisions and the overall 
strategy adopted by the firm; 
2) operational risk: it refers to the risk of losses related to inefficient procedures, 
transactions or policies 
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3) compliance risk: it refers to the risk that the company won’t follow its mandatory 
requirements; 
4) reporting risk: the risk of lack of transparency and disclosure towards the firm’s 
stakeholders. 
Compliance risk is the subgroup where the consequences of corruption can be more relevant, 
the risk that the company won’t comply properly with laws and mandatory requirements.  
Organizations, in fact, are expected to manage the possibility that employees may eventually 
become parts of corruption network and need to prevent this risk. Firms need to identify high-
risk environments, trying to measure the possible impact and consequences of corrupt 
practices in the considered areas. The company policy regarding the fight against corruption 
needs to be clear, well implemented a widely known by employees: an effective 
whistleblowing line is the best way to link management and employees suspecting illegal 
activities, allowing a better communication between control systems and directly involved 
parts (Jeppesen, 2018).  
Detailed documentation reporting the different phases of commercial transactions can also be 
very helpful for the identification of possible corruption episodes, from the purchase to the 
effective reception of good and services (one of the riskiest processes). To avoid bid rigging, 
for example, preapproval of vendors is a widely adopted strategy, but it needs to be integrated 
with systematic monitoring of prices on the market and with an adequate bidding process to 
really stop conflicts of interest. Management, in particular in great organizations, can be 
relatively independent and often in a perfect strategic position to override internal controls. 
An independent monitoring of internal control systems is needed to identify and sanction 
managers who refuse to implement and follow anti-corruption policies; this has gradually 
become one of the key tasks of auditing too.  
Promoting accountability of the involved parts (meant as responsibility of administrators of 
funds, in this context especially regarding public officers) is fundamental to fight any form of 
corruption and illegal activity and it’s one of the most important roles of accounting and 
auditing, which in many cases are fundamental to help governments shape new flexible 






2.3 Accounting as a system to prevent corruption  
 
For centuries, well-implemented accounting practices have been associated with fair 
government and a key to reach prosperity. Accountants have been considered essential 
protagonists of development economic growth in many different realities and ages. During the 
XVI century, accountants were even represented by Dutch artists as honest and probe figures, 
painted with symbolic elements of transparency and balance (Johnston, 2015).  
British artists began to produce similar representations of the figure of the accountant as well, 
adding a sub-genre in which auditors where even judging the dishonest and the lavish, as a 
sort of authoritarian religious figure. Good accounting practices meant that even the richest 
and most powerful individuals had to pay their debts, respect their obligations and follow 
laws, promoting fundamental business-friendly principles like fair competition and 
accountability.  
The role of major firms providing accounting services has changed over the past decades: 
now they tend to be larger and integrated, offering a much wider variety of services end 
expertise, with a range of operations that includes much more than basic bookkeeping and 
accounting services, with a specific focus on consulting activities. 
According to the World Bank (1994) the key steps that developing countries should follow to 
improve accountability and fight corruption are: 
• implementation of an effective and integrated financial management information system; 
• development of an adequate number of accountants and auditors; 
• adoption and application of widely accepted international accounting standards; 
• empowerment of a strong legal framework for supporting modern legal accounting             
practices.                  
Independently from the strategies adopted and from the specific context, accounting is going 
to be a fundamental part of control activities and its role is changing constantly: for these 
reasons, improving and investing in accounting procedures could be particularly helpful in 
developing countries where they are still scarce or non-existent and corruption is still a major 
problem. A more efficient and reliable measurement of economic performance could be very 
helpful to understand the effectiveness of government policies too. 
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Each of the three extremely broad categories of solutions for fighting corruption (control, exit 
and voice) are based on accounting practices. 
• control, in which accounting is naturally oriented toward control systems; 
• exit, in which accounting is oriented to improve profitability and efficiency as well; 
• voice, in which accounting has an important role in showing how public money is 
handled and offering possible improvements and solutions to problems. 
 
Research shows that in most cases anti-corruption organizations tend to prefer exit over 
control strategies (Neu, 2007), as an excessive amount of controls and regulations could have 
unintended effects and increase costs and inefficiency and, at the same time, privatization 
could fight and limit corruption by promoting active competition at a macroeconomic level. 
Petty corruption is more common in developing countries, in particular when private actors 
have to interact with lower level government officials or administrative bureaucrats (Elliot, 
1997), with interactions mostly related to licensing, tax payments and the allocation of 
government-subsidized benefits. The role of accounting in preventing corruption in these 
cases is limited, because basic information and fundamental documents are in many cases not 
available at all. 
In developed countries, anti-corruption barriers are in most cases built following accounting-
based principles (Neu et al., 2013): related provisions can eliminate certain forms of 
corruption (like the straightforward payment of bribes), but at the same time can encourage 
different and more sophisticated forms of corruption. This phenomenon generally assumes the 
form of “networks” where different participants (politicians, accountants etc.) can contribute 
using their influence and help to build an effective corruption network, in many cases 
involving high-level public officials and considerable amounts of money. At these levels, the 
line between regular and irregular transactions can become less clear (Elliot, 1997), in 
particular considering there are often very radical regulations regarding public procurement 
and other government-related activities. 
 
According to Johnston (2015), accounting techniques can become effective anti-corruption 
tools only if they are supported by adequate support from elites and social participation, 
involving other control systems too. At the same time, accounting processes need to be as 
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standardized as possible to be easily applied and to accurately compare different cases across 
the world. In many situations, accounting can be considered a sort of “neutral technology”, 
which is more likely to serve the best interests of whoever is in charge of paying them, with 
notable exceptions only in case of particularly “socially-aware” businesses or public agencies 
and organization subject to more advanced scrutiny. 
 Using well-affirmed and widely accepted accounting practices and strategies, the 
protagonists of these networks can configurate capital flows for personal gains, manipulating 
the distribution of capitals and the strategic positioning of the involved actors. 
Accounting-implicated strategies can allow participants to bypass even very sophisticated 
anti-corruption barriers: in many environments accounting is a powerful tool not only to fight 
corruption but also to facilitate it, providing alternative and effective techniques. In some 
cases, corruption can become commonplace and universally accepted.   
Sargiacomo et al. (2014, p. 90) reported a famous speech delivered Bettino Craxi in the Italian 
Parliament on July 3rd, 1992, in which he describes the terrible condition of the Italian 
System during the “Mani Pulite” scandals: 
“A network of small and large corruption has spread around in the country, in the institutions 
and public administration life, which results in the decay of public life. [. . .] Unfortunately, 
also in regards to political parties, it is often difficult to identify, prevent and amputate 
infected areas, both because of the objective impossibility of adequate controls and, 
sometimes, because of the existence and prevalence of wicked logics. And so, in the shade of 
the irregular financing of political parties and—I repeat—as a consequence of the nature of 
the political system, corruption and bribery flourish, intertwined. These latter offenses must 
be defined, considered, proved and judged as such.” 
Craxi himself was the most important political figure involved in the scandal, being the leader 
of the Socialist Party, but several other public officials, functionaries and entrepreneurs were 
part of corruption networks and the magnitude of the scandal deeply affected the entire Italian 
society, showing the weaknesses and the limitations of accounting-based control systems 
(Sargiacomo et al., 2014), in particular related to public procurement practices.  
Charges of corruption in Italy were pretty common even before the “Mani Pulite” scandal and 
reforms of the justice system were introduced during the eighties, increasing the power of 
judges (Sargiacomo et al., 2014 ). 
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There are three main streams of literature describing corruption from an accounting 
perspective (Barkemeyer et al., 2015).: 
1) one of these streams (conceptual studies) is mostly focused on the distinction between 
the orthodox and radical framings of accounting:  
• the orthodox one, which consists on the contribution of accounting to anti-corruption 
activities (as presented in publications by major supranational organizations like World Bank, 
the OECD or Transparency International); 
• the radical one, instead, is focused on the possible strategies that could be used in 
accounting to facilitate corruption and other illegal activities (Sikka, 2010); 
 
2) a different stream observes and examines in detail different cases of corruption and the 
role of accounting in each case; 
 
3) a third stream is focused on the socio-economic and cultural factors influencing 
corruption in a certain country or industry, including the overall quality of accounting 
procedures. Kimbro (2002), for instance, shows that countries with better financial reporting 
scandals tend to show lower levels of corruption. 
 
Quality of reporting is always fundamental to understand and constrain corruption, but it’s 
definitely not the only factor affecting the phenomenon.  
Generally, good quality accounting practices and a system which is well-integrated with 
international accounting standards are characteristics of developed economies and best 
governed countries in the world, which are generally characterized by a well-developed and 
efficient public sector as well. 
According to Bourdieu’s studies (1990a, 1990b, 2005), in rich countries anti-corruption 
strategies are mostly based on accounting-based barriers, which also have a fundamental role 
limiting the exercise and sale of political influence. Accounting can be very effective against 
explicit bribery activities and very helpful facilitating internal controls, but it isn’t a definitive 
solution to corruption-related problems. 
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In the wrong hands, accounting can provide a great set of tools to build corruption networks 
involving politicians and bureaucrats (from one side) and private firms (on the other side), 
bringing the phenomenon to a different level. Distribution of cash flows and transfer of 
capitals inside a network inevitably require accounting tools, which can also be used 
effectively to go against the barriers imposed by accounting provisions themselves. 
In organized criminal networks involving corruption and other illegal activities (like for 
example money laundering), relationships are built around the accomplishment of a specific 
set of accounting transaction, which may vary according to the needs of the involved parties: 
in these cases accounting isn’t just a tool to “mask” illegal transactions, but becomes the 
backbone which allows the realization and organization of these networks (Neu et al., 2013). 
 
 
2.4 Evolution and characteristics of the Auditing process 
 
The auditing process is one of the protagonists of the fight against corruption involving 
private firms: a proactive approach of auditors may be very helpful to identify illegal 
activities and could become an increasingly important service offered by auditors. 
Auditing may have a fundamental role both in detecting and preventing corruption (Jeppesen, 
2018): the two roles are deeply interrelated and need to be adopted simultaneously, even if 
literature has been mostly focused on the “preventive side”, considered in many cases the real 
purpose of the auditing process.  
Dye and Stapenhurst, for example, affirm that the mere existence of financial auditors should 
“discourage” corruption as “auditors in the private or public sector who have been trained to 
audit financial statements do not have a history of finding much fraud through their audits. 
Their main contribution to preventing corruption has been the strong psychological factor of 
deterrence” (1998, p. 13-14). 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have a fundamental role in reporting on deviations from 
ideal principles of legality, efficiency and effectiveness (Stapenhurst & Dye, 1998), being an 
important pillar while non-SAIs accountants still have an important role, enhancing voice by 
disclosure of the firms’ financial information.  
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SAIs, anyway, have not been particularly successful in the detection and investigation of the 
corruption phenomenon in the past (K. Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 2019), generally limiting 
their activities to auditing processes and leaving the responsibility of most anticorruption 
procedures to administrative and judicial authorities. Khan (2006, p. 5) is of the opinion that 
auditors “can hardly detect or investigate into the actual event of corruption, since the culprits, 
generally, do not leave any documented evidence”: in the most extreme cases, the complete 
absence of information and data could be an obstacle impossible to overcome for auditors. 
International organizations including the International Organization of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) have been trying to promote additional anti-corruption practices 
among SAIs, but their powers in this field are limited compared to other public institutions 
and can become completely ineffective if they aren’t adequately supported by Parliaments and 
can’t count on free and independent media. Well-developed and free information is a crucial 
factor, if auditors want to communicate effectively the results of their work.  
Private auditors generally accept to identify episodes of corruption when it has the form of 
“non-compliance with laws and regulation”, an activity that doesn’t necessarily require an 
investigation and research of possible corruption networks (K. Reichborn-Kjennerud et al., 
2019) and inevitably requires exchange of information with the audited firm’s management, 
but not with the authorities. Public sector auditors often have different professional 
backgrounds ad very different approaches to anti-corruption activities: in this case INTOSAI 
standards can become more important and shape the auditors’ approach.  
Even if most of the SAIs activities is conducted following international principles and 
frameworks approved by INTOSAI itself, which in the past decades have become 
increasingly important and influential: when it was originally founded it used to provide non-
binding auditing standards, but now its “International Standards of Supreme Audit 
Institutions” are widely accepted standards to promote good governance in the public sector, 
improving the credibility and the recognition of INTOSAI worldwide. Auditors, anyway, 
inevitably need to consider local mandates and legislation (INTOSAI, 2016) to conduct their 
activities, with the inevitable formation of different areas of influence.  
A research conducted by K. Reichborn-Kjennerud and others (2019) considers the three main 
differences among auditing processes regarding the levels of the risk related to corruption, the 
number of auditors in each one of the countries studied, and the amount of total investments 
in the auditing process. The study compares SAIs in the Scandinavian regions (with low 
levels of corruption according to international rankings), in Southern Europe (medium levels 
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of corruption) and in Africa (very high levels of corruption). The results show that African 
SAIs have a more active role in the fight against corruption, in most cases going directly 
against the will of local corrupted governments. Anyway, it’s fundamental to consider that an 
active approach doesn’t necessarily mean that SAIs will achieve a satisfactory outcome: even 
if corruption episodes have been successfully identified and exposed, they can only be 
stopped with an effective intervention of local authorities, which in many environments can 
be really challenging, in particular (as seen before) when corruption is completely socially 
accepted. In many developing countries SAIs often don’t have sufficient funds and technical 
skills to conduct adequate audits. 
INTOSAI guidelines (INTOSAI, 2016) underline also the importance of effective internal 
financial management systems, in particular the ones based on effective financial reporting 
and disclosure, but only if they are cooperating efficiently, following auditors’ guidelines and 
improving relationships and exchange of information with other key stakeholders (in primis 






















Corruption networks are still extremely common even in developed countries and among 
businesses above any suspicion; during the past decades extreme cases, involving even 
thousands of people and causing damages for billions, have seriously damaged the reputation 
of industries and even entire countries. As previously discussed, accounting has a 
fundamental role in fighting illegal activities building barriers against corruption, but the same 
principles can be adopted to find specific ways around these barriers, offering at the same 
time the level of accuracy and secrecy required by the nature of the corruption network’s 
transactions (Neu et al., 2013).   
Accounting can become a fundamental and reliable tool to realize efficient corruption 
networks. Any kind of complex activity involving cash flows and transactions inevitably 
requires a certain level of organization and control, accounting processes can be powerful 
instruments to mask corruption, hiding and disguising illegal transactions between the 
involved parties. To achieve more productive relationships between involved social actors, the 
components of the network should be focused on contribution and not mere imitation of 
accounting procedures, combining them with other forms of expertise and technology 
(Ahrens, 2009). 
This phenomenon is clearly more common when the amount of money and the number of 
people involved can justify the realization of a corruption network: these levels of corruption 
can require a complex network to be sustainable and effective overtime (unlike isolated 
episodes of petty corruption). Tools and strategies adopted in these activities are going to be 
extremely different according to the environment, the context and the size of the corruption 
network. 
 




Significant episodes of systemic corruption and corporate fraud have been always based on 
“networks that are explicitly built around the accomplishment of a specific set of accounting 
transactions” (Neu et al., 2013, p. 506). Corruption networks adopt strategies and techniques 
very similar to those adopted in other illegal activities involving huge amounts of capital, like 
international money laundering.  
Vannucci (2015) identifies the fundamental components of a corruption network in a 
definition of Banfield (1975, p. 587, emphasis added) “The frame of reference is one in which 
an agent serves (or fails to serve) the interest of a principal. The agent is a person who has 
accepted an obligation (as in an employment contract) to act on behalf of his principal in 
some range of matters and, in doing so, to serve the principal’s interest as if it were his own. 
The principal may be a person or an entity such an organization or the public. In acting on 
behalf of his principal the agent must exercise some discretion; the wider the range (measured 
in terms of effects on the principal’s interest) among which he may choose, the broader his 
discretion. The situation includes third parties (persons or abstract entities) who stand to gain 
or lose from the action of the agent. There are rules (both laws and generally accepted 
standards of right conduct) violation of which entails some probability of penalty (cost) being 
imposed upon the violator”. Corruption networks may adopt very different shapes and sizes 
(according to the flows they have to hide and to the nature of the protagonists of the network 
itself), but are generally based on principal-agent theoretical frameworks and a form of abuse 
of power born from a delegation of decision-making power and subsequent betrayal of the 
trust of the principal (in many cases the public), where the agent (generally a public officials) 
can benefit from the inevitable information asymmetry generated by these kind of processes, 
often bypassing control systems (Vannucci, 2015). The misuse of power and connections is 
going to be more profitable if the agent has the opportunity to build mutually beneficial 
relationships with third parties (the “demand-side” of the corruption network), generally 
private firms or individuals interested in accessing the resources handled by the agent. An 
excessive number of actors directly involved in the corruption network may compromise the 
secrecy of the affair, so the components should handle their connections and information 
carefully and select cautiously eventual new components. 
For its strategic position within the organization and having access to the principal’s funds, 
the agent is generally the leader of the entire network and it’s in charge of handling 
relationships and transactions between the network components (Khan, 1996). 
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The activities of the network may require the creation of slush funds for occasional bribery of 
important figures outside the network or to handle more accurately the compensation of the 
network’s components. 
 
The potential profits coming from privileged relationships with public officials encourage 
rent-seeking, referred as “the activities and expenditures of individuals who seek to change 
rights to earn the above normal profits described as rents” (Khan, 1996, p. 687). It’s not 
necessarily an illegal practice and it’s also common in form of legitimate activities, such as 
lobbying, but it’s anyway a fundamental component to measure corruption and its 
consequences: getting approximations of the total amount of money invested in this kind of 
activities, researchers can also get an idea of the total number of possible agents “competing” 
for the rent and obtain more detailed information about the size of the corruption networks 
and about the characteristics and roles of the social actors involved. 
When the “habitus” of the corruption network is finally established and the social actors know 
and understand the real nature of the disguised accounting transactions, the components can 
always adopt new practices if the evolution of the network will require it, while keeping their 
role inside the network and creating a consolidated and effective series of activities 
(Bourdieu, 2005).  
Because of this “solidification” of practices and strategies, sudden external changes may 
deeply damage the structure of the corruption network, in particular if there isn’t proper 
communication between components. The corruption network needs stability and 
predictability to prosper, even more than regular traditional businesses. 
Corruption networks have to face challenges and problems even unrelated to problems with 
the law or with control systems, for example: 
• key components may retire or be transferred to a different position, possibly 
compromising the entire network; 
• significant and unpredictable external changes affect the project and/or the industry of 
the corruption network. 
These kinds of issues may generate instability and may require a complete reconfiguration of 
the entire network, disrupting the current habitus and forcing the components to completely 
revise the accounting practices previously adopted.   
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If firms have already “invested” time and resources in key connections to become part of a 
corruption network, losing a key social actor involved in the network (for example after the 
arrest of a public official involved) could seriously damage the financial position of the firms 
and their future development.  
Becoming part of a corruption network can provide significant comparative advantage, 
especially becoming a key component of the affair, with important connections to the other 
parties and with a significant control over cash flows. However, at the same time an important 
role within the network can cause a dangerous and risky interdependence with the other social 
actors involved. The human component (both corruptors and corrupted) of the corruption 
network can be harder to replace than in most legitimate business transactions, in particular in 
contexts where removed bureaucrats have been gaining influence and power while building 
their own corruption network for years.      
 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical model of sustained and successful corporate illegality 




In their research, Gabbioneta et al. (2013) provide a theoretical model of sustained and 
successful corporate illegality, showing the most important factors which can allow firms 
beyond any suspicion to build effective corruption networks. 
The “celebrity status” of a firm involved in a corruption network or other illegal activity is an 
underrated key factor: a successful expansion in the previous years combined with a rapid 
growth of the firm in an international context can generate a very positive (and even too 
optimistic) presentation of the firm by the media, inevitably influencing the opinion of 
stakeholders.  
Even independent analysts, working on a firm universally presented as extremely successful 
and promising, may end up conforming to the public opinions merely for reputational matters, 
in particular in conditions of uncertainty.  
Companies like Parmalat (before the scandal) even conducted sorts of “road shows” 
promoting the successes of the firms to financial observers (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) like a 
sort of political convention. Analysts criticizing the firm’s financial situation may even get 
discredited by the media, discouraging future criticism towards the company, especially if the 
latter can count on an unconditioned and irrational support from its investors, a phenomenon 
that can dangerously decrease the necessary “social distance” from a company and its 
stockholders.  
These factors can generate a process of institutional ascription, where the firm ends up being 
recognized as professional and successful without real support from reliable data and in the 
most irrational situations can even become above any suspicion, reducing the levels of 
scrutiny and scepticism from external and internal observers (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). 
Well-affirmed companies can also count on regulatory loopholes related to accounting and 
auditing principles to hide their worsening performance or illegal transactions through 
specific accounting tools (even for several years and handling billions). 
Combining all these conditions with a privileged access to key resources and with a reason to 
hide the firm’s activities (for worsening performance in case of Parmalat, but also in case of 
embezzlement and bribery), corporate illegality can become successful and sustainable for 
years, reinforced by the apparent success and trustworthiness of the firm involved in the 
scandal. 
Relationships between the social actors involved are often the most precious resources of the 
corruption network, but estimating the effective value of connections with key social actors is 
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in most cases impossible, especially considering the secret and illegal nature of many of these 
relationships. In his research, Fisman (2001) shows that the consequences and the real 
importance of political connections generally are visible and understandable only when the 
social actors are finally identified and the corruption networks are dismantled, after 
investigating on companies accounting for a significant percentage of economic activity in 
Indonesia. The disruption of local companies’ political connections with the Indonesian 
government is seen as one of the main causes of the Asian country’s crisis in 1997, as the 
companies’ profitability wasn’t based on efficiency or profitability, but mostly based on the 
firms’ privileged relationships with the local government. 
Comparing the performance measurements of a list of firms involved in scandals (return on 
sales, return on assets, return on equity and market-to-book ratio) with the data related to 
similar firms which weren’t involved in corruption scandals, it is clear that the companies that 
took part in corruption networks have been underperforming  after the removal of their 
political connections, showing that their connections were a significant component of their 
competitive advantage (Fisman, 2001). 
 
 
3.2 The role of accounting practice 
 
According to Ahrens (2009, p. 43) “The literature is filled with examples of how accounting 
can become a resource for change or an obstacle to it; how it can be used to exercise tight 
control or support debate and innovation; how it can be combined with other forms of 
expertise or remain isolated; and how it can dominate social and organizational debates or be 
consigned to the realm of the technical and ignored”.  
Accounting as a social and organizational phenomenon can be effectively implemented in 
different contexts and combined with different technologies and practices, adapting to the 
different needs of the involved social actors. 
Flows of capital can go through apparently legal accounting entities, which can allow the 
members of the network to provide financial returns to the involved public officials, 
disguising them as legitimate transactions. Adding these additional entities, costs can be 
artificially increased, justifying bigger capital flows following a “cost plus” pricing strategy, 
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which is one of the most widely adopted in this kind of activities (Neu et al., 2013), especially 
when government spending is involved. 
Bourdieu (2005) underlines the fundamental difference between professional accounting 
practices, regarding professional accountants in legitimate businesses, and the mere adoption 
of accounting practices and principles, adopted to efficiently keep track of corruption 
networks’ transactions: in the first case accountants have strict rules and procedures to follow, 
while in the second case the basic bookkeeping principles can be completely shaped 
according to the needs of the actors directly involved in the illegal network. As a 
consequence, accounting practices adopted inside a corruption network are going to be 
directly shaped by the wishes of the participants and could be hard to interpret and understand 
outside the network. 
Bourdieu describes three fundamental concepts required to understand the role of accounting 
in the realization and configuration of networks: capital, habitus and social position: 
• “habitus” is a sort of practical sense and institutional memory, regarding a series of 
actors that share the same ways of thinking, planning and acting; 
 
• “social position” is a relational concept, separating the corruption network in different 
social spaces, with different areas of influence, relations and access to capital flows; 
 
• “capital” can be separated in four fundamental types:  
1. cultural capital, related to knowledge and fundamental skills; 
2. economic capital, representing access to significant financial resources; 
3. social capital, related to the role of the relations involved in the network; 
4. symbolic capital, the ability to mask the illegal activities. 
 
These fundamental components need to be progressively combined and adapted to the 
characteristics of the corruption network. The main role of the accounting practices adopted is 
the successful organization of this components: the important relations between the 
components of the network are strictly interconnected with the amount and intensity of cash 
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flows and related accounting transactions, which are also the key to the process of distribution 
of the illegal gains produced by the network (generally recurring to slush funds). 
Different businesses and different transactions offer different opportunities to the corruption 
network. For example, public procurement processes (before, during and even after the 
processes of selection and assignment) offers great opportunities for corruption in very 
different settings.  
At the beginning of the process is even possible to accurately determine the typology and the 
number of social actors which is going to be involved in the network, while stopping any 
form of competition and even agreeing to limit external controls (Ravenda et al., 2018).  
Besides, in public procurement the market price of goods and services isn’t available and can 
be very hard to accurately quantify even by an external observer (for the nature of the process 
itself), especially considering that auditing can’t cover every possible corruption strategy and 
in this field there are countless ways to hide illegal network behind legitimate formal 
processes (Neu et al., 2013). 
Accounting practices have similar roles both regarding corruption networks and regarding 
legitimate business activities: they provide accountability and details about every transaction, 
allowing interested actors to obtain information about the evolution of the recorded activities.  
These processes are also fundamental to valorise the different types of capital, according to 
the possible contributions to the network and their “re-valorisation” as symbolic capital, 
accepted and recognized as legit capital outside the corruption network. Through the 
repetition of these processes inside the network, illegal activities become gradually accepted 
and accounting contributes to “normalize” corruption (Ahrens, 2009), which becomes an 
apparently legitimate business activity even to external observers; when these practices 
become common and constant, even outside control systems may end up trusting the network, 
whose processes can even become universally accepted.  
Research shows that an effective combination in corruption techniques can deeply influence 
the accounting choices made by management, when choices regarding the registration and 
capitalization  of certain costs are discretional (Mazzi et al., 2019): the adoption of different 
approaches for personal gain can negatively affect the firm’s financial reports, providing 
inaccurate and potentially harmful information to investors and other stakeholders. 
An alteration of the value of the current assets reported on the balance sheet is one of the most 
important and common phenomenon of corrupt accounting procedures: it allows management 
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to boost expectations of future growth and profitability (in particular regarding investments in 
research and development), in many cases exploiting the accounting regulations among 
different countries (Ahmed & Falk, 2006) which in many cases generate different results even 
when international accounting standards should be mandatory. Nonetheless, uniformity of 
accounting principles doesn’t necessarily mean completely identical registration of the same 
items and transactions   
Anti-corruption policies are in many cases focused exclusively on preventing public-sector 
levels of corruption, ignoring the tools provided by apparently legal and legitimate accounting 
procedures. Managers are inevitably protagonists of these activities, but can have very 
different roles according to their position and access to accounting instruments and reporting 
choices.  
Strategic management of accounting transactions can be a very effective tool to conduct 
illegal  activities, especially among firms which aren’t publicly traded and have less incentive 
to provide reliable and accurate financial statements, in particular if they already have a 
dominant market position (Ravenda et al., 2018).  
Accounting and auditing-related internal control processes may be unsuccessful in fighting 
corruption, in particular if they are still primarily focused on measuring economic 
performance instead of preventing illegal activities. Accounting practices should therefore be 
focused on promoting accountability through the improvement of quality and type of all 
available information needed by stakeholders (Johnston, 2015), in particular intensifying 
mandatory disclosure regarding: 
• sources of funding and supply; 
• anti-competitive practices; 
• legislative and regulatory privileges; 
• awarding criteria for public infrastructure and concessions; 
• terms of trade with suppliers and customers. 
These are the relationships which offer more opportunities for corruption and money 
laundering, in particular regarding organized crime.  
 




Enron’s bankruptcy is one of the most important recent cases of corruption network 
(especially from an accounting perspective) for its indiscriminate use of Special Purpose 
Entities (SPEs) to rearrange its financial statement and for the direct involvement of Arthur 
Andersen, auditor of the company and one of the most important CPA firms in the world. 
Benston and Hartgraves (2002) have individuated a series of key accounting and auditing 
related issues which were widely adopted by Enron to manipulate their figures: 
• the privileged accounting policies related to the consolidation of SPEs (ideal for 
hiding debt and losses); 
• accounting treatment of sales of Enron to unconsolidated SPEs (treated as arm’s 
length transactions); 
• inaccurate income recognition; 
• Enron’s accounting for its stock, that was issued to and held by SPEs; 
• fair-value accounting resulting in restatements of inaccurate merchant investments; 
• inadequate disclosure of related party transactions and their consequences for 
stockholders. 
 
Enron used to have transactions with hundreds of different SPEs, to hide foreign-driven 
income from US taxation, but also to conduct domestic business with Enron itself, which used 
them to guarantee its debt too. These SPEs didn’t even required consolidation as long as third 
parties kept equity interest in the SPE, even with insignificant participation (3% of the SPE’s 
assets was considered sufficient by the GAAP regulation).  
The Enron scandal generated massive lack of trust regarding independent public accountants, 
which in this case lacked the scepticism required by their role and were unable to identify the 
massive corruption network built by Enron managers, underlying the possibly catastrophic 
potential offered by apparently legal and legitimate accounting practices. 
For these reasons, Benston and Hartgraves (2002) consider in their research US GAAP (and 
related promotors and administrators like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board) among the main responsible of the Enron scandal, 
especially regarding the regulation of SPEs, considering that Enron was able to use them so 
effectively to legally hide its liabilities, underlying the fundamental role and responsibilities 
of the regulators. 
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Benston and Hartgraves (2002) also provide three main reasons why the involved auditors 
(and other auditors in the same situation) may have failed to identify Enron’s illegal practices: 
• lack of necessary scepticism exclusively from Andersen’s auditors (so it can be seen only as a 
failure of the auditors directly involved); 
• a protract association between Enron and the same auditors for several years; 
• a direct support of certain aggressive and misleading accounting practices, for personal 
interest; 
• direct involvement of the auditors in illegal practices; 
• incapacity of understanding the complex structuring of the network. 
These possible causes, even in a less sophisticated context, may be challenging to prevent and 
avoid, especially considering that one of the fundamental components of the auditing process 
is a full understanding of the audited firm’s pre-existing activities and for this reason 
successfully replacing auditors may be a complex procedure. 
 
 
3.3 Corruption networks in developing countries 
 
One of the most important factors affecting corporation illegality in several environments is 
the institutional context, in particular in the realization of the most sophisticated and lasting 
corruption networks (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). “Creatively planned” accounting inaccuracies 
can be very successful instruments to hide irregular transactions and manipulating financial 
reporting.  
These distortions and manipulations can become the norm if institutional ascription allows it 
and if legislation provides significant loopholes; the phenomenon is extremely common and 






3.3.1 Short-term financing and corruption networks: the example of China 
 
In countries like China, where corruption has still roots in almost every level of any industry, 
even very important corporate financing choices made by publicly traded companies can be 
influenced by key connections with public officials, in many cases ignoring the effective 
profitability of the investments, as shown in a research made by Fan, Rui, and Zhao (2008).  
In particular in emerging markets, short-term debt is still the most important source of 
financing even for big and medium-sized companies: obtaining stable capital flows from 
short-term debt is still crucial for the early development of any firm, but in many countries the 
access to this key resource is influenced mostly by the relationships of the firm’s managers 
with financial institutions and their participation in a corruption network. 
In China, an important position in a powerful corruption network can also generate additional 
benefits. Politically well-connected firms can obtain access to long-term debt with an 
important comparative advantage and, as a consequence, gaining a privileged strategic 
position, in the most extreme case with a significant and unfair competitive advantage (Fan, 
Rui, and Zhao, 2008), creating a vicious cycle rewarding more and more illegal transactions 
while damaging fair competition.  
In industries and environments where this kind of corruption networks is more common, 
corruption can allow a successful market positioning of low-quality or even dangerous 
products, damaging the final customers too.  
In this way, companies in developing markets tend to have very high corporate financial 
leverage (in particular if compared to western firms with similar size and active in the same 
industry) and are consequently more exposed to external risks and dependent from debt. 
Through loans, bureaucrats and managers in charge of financial institutions can easily send 
enormous amounts of capital to the firms involved in their corruption network, the situation 
can be particularly extreme in countries where the entire financial system is directly 
controlled by the government, increasing the possible power and area of influence of 
corrupted officials.  
Furthermore, countries where this practice is more common are often characterized by weak 
public governance, so investors tend to prefer debt because it offers more guarantees and 
enforcement abilities compared to equity, which in the most extreme cases could be even 
stolen by the firm’s managers. Improving the efficiency and the transparency of the equity 
market, deserving businesses could gain access to alternative source of financing and improve 
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their leverages, becoming gradually independent from corrupted officials, who can’t possibly 
control and manipulate equity markets. 
Bribing public officials sometimes becomes the only way firms have to access short-term 
debt, while implementing solid relationships with corrupted bureaucrats is the only way to 
gain access to stable and significant flows of long-term debt (Fan, Rui, and Zhao, 2008). 
Long-term debt is riskier for lenders and harder to obtain for small firms, but it’s fundamental 
to allow businesses to grow: if organizations directly involved in corruption networks can 
obtain loans more easily (even without real merit), corruption becomes an obstacle to fair 
competition as well and corruption networks end up causing massive misallocations of capital 
that entire countries desperately need, while the financial system ends up rewarding poorly 
managed companies. Corruption in this case is damaging society as a whole and not only 
single, isolated companies. 
Inevitably, these illegal processes have generated enormous amounts of non-performing loans 
for the state-owned Chinese banks during the past decades (Allen et al., 2005) and obtained 
more detailed information and transparency can be challenging because of the Chinese 
government’s opaque policies. When political officials have direct control over natural 
resources or development licenses and are actively involved in a corruption network, they 
may promote a very harmful allocation of key resources: the outputs of a corrupt market 
aren’t a product of competition and innovation, but they are deeply influenced by the needs of 
the actors involved in the corruption network.  
Money could be invested in unprofitable projects and employees may be hired and placed in 
key positions even without real merit or required technical skills. 
As shown by Fan, Rui, and Zhao in their research (2008), after corruption scandals and the 
removal of guilty public officers and relative connections, the companies that participated in 
corruption networks have shown a statistically significant underperformance after the scandal.   
 
3.3.2 Patrimonial and clientelist patron-client networks  
 
In many African countries, the very sudden government transitions, from authoritarianism to 
democracy and from planned economy to free market, have been deeply interconnected with 
higher levels of illegal activities involving public officials and with the reinforcements of 
corruption networks: socioeconomical crisis and continuous changes of power are the perfect 
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environment to create new key connections between different social actors within corruption 
networks, especially if government transitions are followed by increasingly interventionist 
economic policies, historically extremely common in the African continent (Rock & Bonnet, 
2004).  
When corrupt governments have the opportunity to build from scratch a new set of laws (for 
example after revolutions) they have the possibility to legitimize their activities while 
appearing as a legitimate government, allowing them to commit various atrocities while 
reinforcing their positions within the corruption network, hiding the profits of their activities 
in offshore bank accounts. Peaks of corruption activities and capital flow right before these 
regimes’ collapses, with even more catastrophic consequences for the nations’ economies.  
In Asian countries, instead, corruption networks have had a fundamental role in implementing 
and financing governments’ economic policies, achieving their objectives through patron-
client networks (Khan, 1996). The main distinction, in this case is between “patrimonial” and 
“clientelist” patron-client networks. 
In case of patrimonial patron-client networks, the network is not focused exclusively on the 
personal gain of clients, which are generally the dominating players inside the network, but on 
the needs of patrons and of society as a whole, in some cases actively investing in the 
countries’ growth and enforcing property rights, key strategies for the countries’ development 
(Rock & Bonnet, 2004); this typology was more common in Asian countries. 
In South Korea, for example, the government patrons even adopted performance monitoring 
to keep their clients accountable for their activities, checking and measuring if businesses 
involved were boosting the country’s economic growth while accepting occasional bribes 
through well organised channels, with mutual benefits for both parties and in some cases for 
the entire country, through the protection and enforcement of property rights and the 
acceleration of economic development, especially during the second half of the 20th century 
(Rock and Bonnet, 2004). 
This kind of network can survive only if the state can enforce effectively property rights and 
can protect the interest of the social actors involved in the network: these conditions are 
generally respected in developed countries, but aren’t common in the developing world, 
especially in African countries and in unstable political situations. Even if in some cases this 
model provides some benefits to developing economies, this kind of network inevitably 
generates injustice and solidification of the connections between political power and private 
firms, damaging fair competition. 
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In clientelist patron-client network, instead, property rights aren’t as well affirmed and the 
allocation of rights and related distribution of power are going to be less accurate and stable, 
mostly because the personal power and the connections of the public officials involved are 
less significant and organized (Khan, 1996). This scenario is more common in the developing 
world and it’s also characterized by much lower levels of efficiency and, in many cases, by 
the involvement of additional “clientelist” social actors (like criminal organizations) which 
can work for different parties, compensating the weaknesses of legitimate institutions. 
The scenario is also determined by the organization of the involved corruption networks: if 
they are organized by a strong central social actor, generally an authoritarian state (but also an 
industry monopoly), corruption is going to be less harmful compared to the case in which a 
small group of corrupted officials is acting as a monopolist exclusively for personal profit, a 
case which is much more common especially in the developing world  (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). In the latter case, public officials just want to profit as much as possible from their 
position before getting replaced, both from the state they should be serving and from the 




3.3.3 Organization and social costs of corruption networks 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) provide a fundamental classification of possible bribes and their 
social costs, from drops in efficiency and productivity to higher costs for fundamental goods 
and services:  
• in the first case there is an extreme concentration of power, with a single agency 
supplying all relevant rights; 
• in the second case, in a fragmented state there are different agencies providing 
complementary rights, so users will consequently have to deal with agencies separately; 
• in the third case there are always different agencies, but they can all provide all the 
services required by the users (becoming de facto sort of “competitors”). 
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In the first case there is a sort of monopoly, in the hand of public officials: the total amount of 
bribes spent is going to be the highest, as public officials in charge are free to ask as much as 
they want to maximize their profit.  
The second case, instead, can be compared to a Cournot oligopoly in industrial organization: 
different agencies are allowed to provide only part of the total amount of services required by 
bribers. If one of the agencies will increase too much its prices, it could discourage additional 
investments and overall reducing the total activities of the corruption network, damaging 
other agencies too. Both output and overall efficiency of the corruption network are 
consequently lower than in the first case. 
In the third case, competition between different public officials will lower the total amount of 
bribes required: even if the activities of the corruption networks don’t decline, the prices 
offered by the competing agencies are going to be much lower than in the two previous case 
(theoretically close to zero). 
Consequently, to reduce the costs of corruption, agencies should compete and be allowed to 
provide the same services, while the worst-case scenario is the inefficient fragmentation of the 
second case. The third condition is very hard to find in the real world, while governments of 
countries like South Korea and the Philippines have shown in the past decades characteristics 
which were compatible with those of the monopolistic case, with an omnipresent and 
influential central government, directly involved in almost every industry (Khan, 1996).  
In this case, the briber can be almost sure that after paying the bribe he will effectively get the 
service he needs from the public officials; if these basic conditions aren’t met, a potentially 
unlimited number of bribes involving countless corrupted may be required (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993), with even more negative consequences for the entire economy. 
It’s important to notice that most complex economic activities require several permits and 
authorizations from public officials. An importer, for example, will have to contact different 
officials to import, transport and finally its goods. To build an efficient corruption network, 
these different bribes need to be effectively standardised and organized, penalizing deviations 
from standard procedures: these practices were extremely common in Eastern Europe during 
Cold War, where bribes where channelized through the local offices of the Communist party 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The situation radically changed after the fall of Communism: 
without a central authority in charge of handling the bribes and without any collusion between 
government agents, social actors interested in starting any kind of business had to bribe 
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several different agencies (in some cases including the police and the army), in an unstable 
and chaotic environment, extremely undesirable in particular for foreign investors. 
It’s important to consider, especially for actors which aren’t directly involved in the network, 
that secrecy is a fundamental component of any corruption network and this will inevitably 
cause a distortion of the values reported and of the characteristics of every transaction (at least 
compared to the values reported by a regular business). To maintain acceptable levels of 
secrecy, the network should also involve a possibly very small numbers of components, 
covering a few key positions, while hardly accepting newcomers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
To obtain desired levels of secrecy, corrupt governments may even decide to promote goods 
and services which allow to get higher bribes or goods which are easier to over invoice or 
overpay, to mask illegal transactions more effectively. This practice can sensibly reduce the 
import of goods from abroad, in particular from developed countries, in some cases limiting 
the access of the population to key technologies while boosting the purchases of completely 
unnecessary goods, further damaging local economies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
This phenomenon can cause an unfair redistribution of income even on a macroeconomic 
level, especially for the catastrophic effects of systemic corruption on taxation and 
redistribution of wealth; businesses can’t even afford to pay bribes are completely cut out 
from any possible corruption network and can’t survive, especially if even courts of justice 
end up being absorbed by the network (Barkemeyer et al., 2015). 
For these reasons, many poor countries end up spending so much on sectors like defence and 
infrastructure: they are perfect to build effective corruption networks while hiding enormous 
bribes through apparently legitimate transactions and invoices. Generally, a price to pay for 












CHAPTER IV: Italian MOSE and Canadian 








4.1 Study design 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, accounting practice can provide a wide range of tools to 
realize and organize effective corruption networks, which can involve a wide range of social 
actors and be sustainable in the medium-long term, avoiding control systems and regulators.  
Through a qualitative research approach, this chapter provides a presentation and comparison 
of two examples of corruption network: 
• The Venetian MOSE project scandal; 
• the Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program scandal (1994–2003). 
 
The case studies have different backgrounds and involve different social actors, but 
interestingly they both present similar patterns and encase the key characteristics of 
accounting practices within corruption network (Johnston, 2015; Neu et al., 2013; Neu et al., 
2015; Roberts, 2015; Sargiacomo et al., 2015). 
 
Studying previous scandals, it’s possible to get a better understanding of the proper red flags 
characterizing the different phases of the phenomenon, in particular in public procurement 
settings and with deep interconnections between politics and businesses, extremely common 
conditions in corruption episodes worldwide (Søreide, 2002). 
 
Qualitative approaches have been adopted before in other researches focused on cases of 
corruption and on the role of accounting in the realization of the corruption network (Neu et 
al., 2013; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002; Gabbioneta et al., 2013) and the study has been 
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conducted as a qualitative research, analysing the material and searching for the following key 
elements: 
• the roles of the components and the nature of the relationships among the social actors 
involved; 
• the use of accounting tools in the realization of corruption networks; 
• similarities between the two case studies and the factors illustrated in the previous 
chapters. 
 
The available data have been studied and compared to provide a more accurate presentation of 
the cases, with different perspective on the scandals and on the role of accounting in the 
process. 
After a description of the history and background of the two scandals, the chapter presents an 
analysis of the previously mentioned key elements of corruption networks and a final 




4.2 Data and method 
 
For the nature and the peculiar characteristics of the corruption phenomenon, it isn’t possible 
to conduct interviews toward the protagonists of a corruption network.  
As previously illustrated, corruption and other illegal activities can be challenging to 
investigate and study because of the inevitably hidden and opaque nature of the transactions 
and relationships between the involved parties: in most cases, the only sources of information 
available on the subject are the documents related to the judicial procedures of the 
participants, which become available only when and if the corruption network is successfully 
identified and stopped.  
The main sources of information of the study are the trial documents of the two scandals and 
reports provided by auditors and commissions in charge of examining the cases and their 
consequences.  
 
To present the MOSE corruption network, in this chapter were reviewed and analysed the trial 
documents of the scandal (over 800 pages), with particular attention toward the description of 
the accounting strategies adopted to hide the illegal transactions. Moreover, was analysed an 
examination of one of the enquiry’s verdicts regarding the key protagonists of the corruption 
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network, focusing on the involvement and the role of each component and on the accounting 
tools adopted to hide the network’s illegal activities.  
 
To present the Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program scandal, the documents 
reviewed were related to the forensic audit report provided by Kroll Lindquist Avey (Kroll 
Lindquist Avey, 2005) and the report of the activities conducted by the Gomery Commission 
(2005a and 2005b), a multi-million dollar government project presided by Justice 
Commissioner John H. Gomery, realized to investigate the nature of the scandal and the 
responsibilities of the subjects involved; in their research Neu, Everett, Rahaman and 
Martinez (2013) compare the inquiry to the “Mani Pulite” investigations regarding the Italian 
Tangentopoli scandals. 
The Commission interviewed 172 witnesses from 7 September 2004 to 17 June 2005, 
discovering precious details about the micro-procedures and the cash flows between the 
network’s participants, key elements of this research, publishing the findings in a 700 pages 
report and an additional document with an overall analysis of the case and suggestions and 
guidelines for the policymakers regarding the corruption phenomenon.  
Through the Kroll Lindquist Avey audit report, we can also see the case from a different 
perspective, getting also a better understanding of the role played by accounting tools in the 
identification of irregular procedures and corruption: recording irregular capital flows, even if 
disguised as legitimate transactions, leaves traces on companies’ financial statements, offering 




4.3 MOSE scandal: an Italian example 
 
 
4.3.1 History of MOSE scandal 
 
The corruption network built around the realization of the MOSE (abbreviation of MOdulo 
Sperimentale Elettromeccanico, “Sperimental Electromechanical Modul”), is an interesting 
example of successful and sustainable corruption network and it presents many of the 
common key factors of corruption in public procurement. As previously illustrated, public 
procurement (especially regarding major infrastructural projects) provides excellent 
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opportunities for corruption and, at the same time, tools to hide illegal activities and to 
adequately mask cash flows. 
 
The MOSE is an ambitious Venetian infrastructure project realized to save Venice from the 
phenomenon of rising water levels, which have become increasingly dramatic over the last 
decades (Sargiacomo et al., 2015). 
The Consorzio Venezia Nuova (“New Venice Consortium”, from now on referred as “NVC”) 
was put in charge of the project in 1984: the NVC would have been responsible for all the 
phases of planning and realization of the plan. For the magnitude of the project itself, the 
Consortium enjoyed a privileged and extremely influential position: it was allowed to directly 
handle the contracts with private companies for the realization of the project, without regular 
open competitions generally required in this kind of projects.  
The original reason behind this decision was to speed up the entire process, to reduce the costs 
and limit bureaucratic procedures which could have excessively slowed down the works, 
further increasing the costs of the infrastructure: this decision guaranteed to the Consortium a 
significant decision-making autonomy and financial independence.  
 
Building the right relationships and controlling private firms in charge of the project, the 
Consortium had the perfect opportunities to build a very profitable corruption network and, 
thanks to its fundamental role and its privileged position, it easily became the leader and the 
main hub of the affair’s cash flows. The Consortium was also able to successfully handle and 
exploit its important connections with political figures, exercising its power and influence and 
bribing important public officials in key positions, the Consortium and his associates were 
able to keep the network for years without legal consequences.  
The components of the network managed to successfully share the profits from their illegal 
affairs, while providing various benefits even to important figures which weren’t involved in 
the project, to be sure to avoid investigations and slowdowns.  
 
In June 2014, 35 people involved in the realization of the project were arrested on charges of 
the alleged payment of bribes and the appropriation of funds paid to the NVC (more than €23 
million passed through the Consortium only from 2005 to 2011). 
The verdicts of the enquiry were reached in 2017, the total budget required to finish the works 







4.3.2 Protagonists of the scandal 
 
The network’s leader was identified as the President of the NVC, in charge of allocating the 
slush funds among the other components of the network.  
During court hearings, the President of NVC was referred to as the leader of the illegal 
operations by several witnesses and considered for years the “dominus” of the network, 
underlying the fundamental role played by trust and personal relationships between the 
involved parties, fundamental in a corruption network with so many components, to limit the 
risks related to whistle-blowers and keep the network sustainable in the long term.  
This strategy worked and, after years of illegal transactions and bribing, the components 
ended up feeling completely untouchable and above the law, even after the initial 
investigations of Guardia di Finanza (Italian Fiscal Police) for causes unrelated to the 
redistribution of slush funds.  
 
A board of trusted members oversaw the NVC’s illegal activities and relationships with other 
components of the network, assigning the construction activities and establishing the rates of 
slush funds with the other main partners of the Consortium.  
 
“…a continuous cash flow was required, of let’s say slush off-accounts funds, to handle two 
principal kind of operations. Greasing, that’s the term adopted to, ehm, receive positive 
attitudes from public officials directly involved. And also toward all the people needed to 
receive funds and carry forward the project. Because this is a common problem which has 
always existed in Italy…” (Hearings, Court of Venice, 16-06-2016, emphasize added). 
 
There were also funds for regular and systematic corruption of public officials, for example 
bribes for the President of Magistratura delle Acque di Venezia (Venice Water Board) and for 
occasional irregular benefits towards important figures outside the network.  
The latter included even prominent cases involving thousands of euros, like the irregular 
financing of a Venetian candidate mayor’s electoral committee and even the corruption of a 
general of the Fiscal Police.  
 
The control over the Venice Water Board according to witnesses was especially challenging 
because of the continuous alternate of the Board’s members: this could have seriously 
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damaged the structure of the network, considering that replacing key members of a big 
corruption network can damage the fragile and opaque interconnections between pre-existing 
components (Bourdieu, 2005), but the network was able to keep stable and efficient its 
internal relationships, while keep paying individuals in key position even if they weren’t 
directly involved in the network anymore. The Venice Water Board was in the key position to 
speed up the approval of projects, so the cooperation of the Board and related Comitato 
Tecnico (“Technical Committee”) was fundamental to avoid any slowdown of the network’s 
activities. greasing the skids of this decisional process was one of the main priorities of the 
NVC to keep the network profitable. 
 
Another important consortium involved in the affair was COVECO, the consortium in charge 
of handling the relationship of the network with many of the firms involved and one of the 
key components of the supply chain of corruption managed by the NVC.  
 
The Italian construction company Mantovani S.p.A., specialized in major infrastructure 
projects, had also a key position in the network, with direct links to the NVC decisional 
process, in particular after taking over the position of other firms in key roles of the 
realization of the process, buying their participations in 2004. 
Mantovani has also been for years the main “contributor” of the fund in charge of covering 
the bribing needs of the network and was directly in charge of providing additional benefits 
for individuals and organizations in key positions (even if they weren’t directly involved in 
the corruption network activities), including even the former President of Veneto Regional 
Authority; hundreds of thousands of euros were spent by Mantovani on renovations of the 
former president’s house, just to avoid any possible intrusions from the Regional Authority 
and slowdowns to the operations. 
 
“…In fact, it wasn’t negotiated…because there was, how to say, a kind of relationship which 
made us understand that the works had to be done almost for free. At least, this wasn’t part of 
the deal’s details at the beginning, but it was clear that being the President…This was a sort of 
strategy to establish a good relationship which could have been able to facilitate the firm’s 
business…” (Hearings, Court of Venice, 22-09-2016, emphasis added). 
 
Like in this case, obtaining the favour or at least stopping possible oppositions from key 
individuals (even if they aren’t directly and continuously involved in the network’s activities) 




For the same reasons, the NVC tried to improve the relationship with the Regional Council of 
the Veneto region too, keeping the contacts between the two parties constant and positive. 
Cooperation between the two was also in the best interest of the President of the Regional 
Council, which could achieve a better relationship with the entrepreneurial environment and 
therefore political support, in particular after the instauration of more informal personal 
relationship and reciprocal trust. 
 
 
The redistribution of slush funds, the administration of the already paid funds and the strategy 
adopted in the emission of invoices were all handled within the same fund, which according 
to witnesses even reached a size of €24 million. Depositing the entire amount of capital in a 
central common fund, the effective contributions of single organizations or even individuals 
become harder to identify and the parties can’t exactly know which parts of their 
“contributions” was used to bribe which public officials, but the component’s financial 
position and eventual debts/credits with the fund were accurately documented. (Sentence, 
Court of Venice). 
 
The main actors involved in the affair and their roles are summarized in the following table. 
 
Figure 4.1 The MOSE affair Corruption Network 
 
Key components of the corruption 
network 
Role 
New Venice Consortium 
 
Consortium in charge of the assignment of 
contracts regarding the realization of the 
MOSE. 
 
Leader of the network, it handled the 
redistribution of slush funds generated 
through the irregular invoicing procedure. 
 
Mantovani S.p.A Italian construction company specialized in 
major infrastructure projects. 
 
The most important private firm involved in 
the scandal, handling contracts with other 
smaller firms involved in the affair, 
providing bribes for other key actors, both 
systematically and occasionally. 
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Venice Water Board It’s a suppressed administrative authority, in 
charge of supervising activities of quenching 
and maintenance of Venetian territory. 
 
It was object of systematic corruption from 
the other key players of the network, for its 
fundamental role in the approval of projects 
in Venice Lagoon. 
COVECO Another important consortium involved in 
the project. 
 
Directly handling the connections between 





Significant external recipients of benefits 
from the corruption network 
Nature of the benefits received 
President of Veneto Regional Authority Renovation works worth thousands of euros 
paid and provided by Mantovani S.p.A. 
General of the Fiscal Police Occasional bribes. 
Venetian candidate mayor’s electoral 
committee 
Irregular donations for the election 





4.3.3 Role of accounting in the realization of the corruption network 
 
Public procurement offers many opportunities to corruption networks (Søreide, 2002), in 
particular adopting the cost plus pricing strategy to justify additional capital flows and 
redirection of public funding toward the component of the network (Neu et al., 2013): this 
practice becomes extremely common in particular during the realization of major 
infrastructure projects, like the MOSE. 
In these situations, accounting tools adopted to sustain the corruption network aren’t as 
sophisticated as those adopted in the Enron case and similar major scandals, where the 
company’s management implemented complex strategies and accounting tools like SPEs to 
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exploit the weaknesses of American regulations and auditors’ controls (Benston and 
Hartgraves, 2002). 
The most common instrument adopted in public procurement settings is the emission of fake 
invoices, in particular when they are presented to justify unexpected expenses or in case of 
prolongation of the project. 
 
The project enjoyed a “closed price” status: the greatness and importance drove the Comitato 
interministeriale per la programmazione economica (“Inter-ministerial committee for 
economic planification” from now on CIPE), in charge of financially estimating the needs of 
the entire affair, to assign a budget to the project. However, additional funding was 
successively added after the intervention of the Venice Water Board and an extra 18% risk 
fund was added to the total budget.  
Estimating in advance an accurate approximation of the total budget required can be 
extremely challenging or even impossible for this kind of projects; the corruption network 
was able to exploit this limitation to extend the duration of the works and their personal 
profits. 
 
In the MOSE affair, misuse of invoices was the most important tool adopted by the network’s 
components to redistribute slush funds: the construction companies directly involved in these 
illegal procedures took advantage even of the favourable San Marino legislation on the 
subject to provide fake invoices and sustain the illegal transactions inside the network.  
Before 2012, in fact, in San Marino there were no criminal penalties for the emission of 
invoices regarding non-existent operations: the two companies were able to conduct these 
operations from 2004 to 2010 through the consulting firm BMC Broker, officially registered 
in San Marino.  
Many fake invoices were also provided on the Italian territory, in most cases with extremely 
generic subject, and were generally referred to technical assistance operations, such as: 
 
“support in the study and planification of environmental monitoring activities, acoustic 
detection (…) of the seafloor, bathymetric analysis and coring of the seafloor, including in the 
technical professional valuation of military risk in the sea and in other watershed” (doc. 2, 
attached to the statement of defence, Court of Venice, 18-07-2017). 
 
Many invoices didn’t even mention the number of workers involved, the hours required to 
complete the operation and the technical means adopted to conduct the activities: analysing if 
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the invoices have been oversized can be challenging or even impossible and an eventual 
technical verification would be inconclusive, keeping secret and unidentified the illegal 
transactions. 
 
NVC adopted different invoicing policies regarding different kind of operations to get back 
part of the money through apparently regular transactions. 
 
“So, the operations of NVC involving stone works had a net profit higher than the average net 
profit from operations. The deal inside the Consortium was that to have a distribution plan 
with uniform margins, assignees with a particular margin would have had to give back to the 
Consortium part of it. Stone works were an example of these operations, 5% of the total value 
of the category had to be given back (…)”  (Hearings, Court of Venice, 15-09-2016). 
 
If firms wanted to work for the project, they had to accept the NCV conditions, considering 
that public competition wasn’t expected for the peculiar nature of the project.  
After the determination of the amount of slush funds required by the NCV, another of his 
main partner firms would have asked the new firm for an invoice, without the provision of 
any service.  
 
“QUESTION: Normally what amount was given back to the Consortium? 
ANSWER: It partially depended on the situation, but it was around the 50%… 
QUESTION: Can you tell us which firms adopted this practice to give back amount of money 
to the Consortium? 
ANSWER: Almost all of them, directly or indirectly…” (Hearings, Court of Venice, 31-07-
2013). 
 
The main partner firm of NVC would have then invoiced the NVC itself for the total amount.  
So, the Consortium would have paid the partner firm, which would have finally paid the other 
firm, following regular and legal procedures, but after the transaction the firm would have 
secretly given back to the NVC a significant percentage of the total amount received. 
The ratio which was given back used to differ according to the service provided, from the 5% 
related to the previously mentioned stone works, to over 50% in case of generic provisions of 
services which, for the unpredictable and specific nature of the activities theoretically carried 
out by the firm, allowed to fake larger margins and move larger amounts of slush funds.  




The contracts involving fake invoices were distributed in four different “bocche di porto” 
according to their geographical positions (Treporti, Lido, Malamocco and Chioggia) and 
assigned to different firms, which were in charge to periodically give back to the NVC part of 
the money.  
 
“…this contract required that allotments had to be paid every three months. The payment was 
adjusted according to two main aspects, a so-called fixed one and a variable one connected to 
the revenue of the bocca di porto in the examined period of time.…regarding us this amount 
was around 200-220.000 euros, but it was never the same and 50% of the amount was given 
back to the Consortium, so around 100.000 euros of slush funds every 4 months…” 
(Hearings, Court of Venice, 16-06-2016, emphasis added). 
 
Slush funds assigned to different components of the network were accurately recorded, 









4.4.1 History of the Canadian government’s Sponsorship Program scandal 
 
The scandal was widely discussed and politicized by the Canadian media in the early 2000s, 
in particular because of the involvement of many key figures of the Liberal Party and for the 
political nature of the Sponsorship Program itself, deeply damaging even the reputations and 
the careers of several members of the Party which weren’t involved in the scandal at any level 
(Sutherland, 2003).  
 
After the electoral success of the Bloc Quebecois, a party promoting the independence of 
Québec, both in the federal election of October 1993 and in September 1994 provincial 
election, the ruling Liberal Party decided to start a program promoting national unity, 
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affirming that it was mandatory to contrast secessionist pressures, granting the project 
significant funds and great decision-making autonomy, considering the urgency and 
importance of the fight against secessionism (Neu et al., 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the Liberal Party didn’t want to lose political support from the Québec region, 
the second most populous in Canadian territory: the electoral success of the Liberal Party was 
based on the success of the party in the two large-population provinces, Québec and Ontario, 
home for over 50% of the Canadian population (Sutherland, 2003).  
The fleur-de-lis, symbol of the Bloc Quebecois has been the symbol of the French-speaking 
minorities of Québec since 1948, promoting independence and sovereignty of the province, 
even recurring to violent attacks and robberies in an attempt to obtain recognition and 
additional autonomy; one of the most significant  achievement of these movements was the 
passing of a French-only Official Languages Act, in 1977 (Seymour, 2000). 
The success of the Bloc Quebecois as a third party in the province was jeopardizing the 
dominance of the Liberal Party not only in the province but also at a national level, and the 
eventuality of a secession of the entire province started to seem possible. The Liberal Party 
therefore decided to fight the secessionist movement hiring an additional number of 
organizers at a local level and promoting national unity through a parallel communication and 
advertising strategy, involving government organizations like the Human Resources 
Development Canada (Gomery, 2005a). 
 
Human Resources Development Canada (from now on HRDC) was founded in 1993, born 
from a government-wide reorganization from components of Employment and Immigration 
Canada, Secretary of State and the department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Health 
and Welfare Canada, Labour Canada. 
The department was mostly focused on employment insurance programs, income security and 
“investment” programs administered by grants and contributions (Sutherland, 2003), 
including the Sponsorship Program described in this chapter, focused on the promotion of 
national unity. 
 
From 1994 to 2003 around $322 million were invested in the Canadian federal government’s 
Sponsorship Program, of which 44.4%, or $147 million, was spent on fees/commissions 
paid to advertising agencies, which often inflated their revenues through irregular invoicing 
practices (Gomery, 2005b), while an amount between $13 million and $50 million was 




The responsibility of overseeing the government advertising projects were transferred to the 
Public Works Department, as part of a reform previously introduced to reduce bureaucracy 
and streamline the government’s most urgent projects, while the Sponsorship Program was 
put directly under the control of the Advertising and Public Opinion Research Sector (from 
now on APORS), a smaller organization controlled by the HRDC. 
 
The director of APORS was able to successfully exploit the autonomy of the program, 
constantly bypassing the Parliament’s approvals of funding and personally handling the 
nomination of the private agencies involved in the project and the relationship with the firms’ 
directors, realizing a profitable corruption network both for the corrupt public servants and 
politicians (including prominent fundraisers of the Liberal Party) and for the private 
advertising agencies working to the program. The corruption network lasted from 1994 to 
2000, when an internal audit of the program and subsequent investigations gradually exposed 
its irregularities (Gomery, 2005b).  
 
 
The media coverage and the size of the scandal were unprecedented for a country like 
Canada, which traditionally achieves very good positioning on corruption international 
rankings like the Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2018). The 
investigations and the activities of analysis of the Gomery Commission allowed control 
systems to get a better understanding of the mechanisms of corruption in Canadian public 
procurement, exposing many risks and critical issues of the system (Sutherland, 2003), which 
could become an endemic phenomenon without a proper intervention of the institutions.  
 
 
4.4.2 Protagonists of the scandal 
 
APORS was an organization within the area of influence of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada (from now on PWGSC), in charge of managing government advertising and 
related contracts with private advertising firms.  
The program started without a public announcement of any kind, without clearly measurable 
objectives and without well-established administrative guidelines, providing great 
opportunities for misspending practices and creating from the beginning the perfect conditions 




The director of APORS kept a very strict control over the organization for years, imposing 
fixed rules on the negotiation of contracts with communications firms, in many cases offering 
exaggerated compensation (based on commission criteria) for irrelevant services; costs were 
estimated ex ante, often without accurate approximation of the expenses related to hours, 
materials and personnel invested by the firms (Gomery, 2005a).  
Anyway, because of his relationships and connections with key political figures, the director 
ended up being above any suspicion, de facto exempting him form standard reporting 
procedures; over the years he was even recognized as efficient and capable of managing 
public funds.  
The Gomery commission identified the director of APORS as the main organizer of the 
corruption network.  
 
“After the first two years, a practice was adopted of including estimated production costs in 
virtually every contract with a communication agency. 
The production costs were sometimes determined as a percentage of the total value of the 
sponsorship, and little effort was made to assess what additional costs might be incurred by 
the agency. This produced the result that production costs became a more important source of 
revenue to the communication agencies than the commissions, and the commissions really 
covered no services at all. In almost every case, the agency charged almost exactly the full 
amount of the estimated production costs” (Gomery, 2005a, p. 177, emphasis added). 
 
The components of the network were de facto allowed to completely make up the money 
needed to provide their services, granting ample mark-ups which would have then been 
shared between the involved actors in the form of repatriations (Neu et al., 2013). 
 
The Minister in Charge of Public Works was the most important key connection of APORS’s 
director with public officials and during his mandate helped to sustain the corruption network 
and the bypassing of the Parliament’s approvals and Treasury Board’s policies (Gomery, 
2005a). It was extremely criticized for the lack of control and management over the entire 
Program, 
 
Lafleur Communication Marketing, Groupe Everest and Groupaction were the most important 
private advertising firms involved in the scandal, key protagonists of the sponsorship 
contracts with the Canadian government. 
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Lafleur Communications, as lead member of a small consortium of communication agencies, 
received contracts for millions of dollars since 1995 (which significantly increased after the 
official introduction of the Program), even without being part of a pre-qualified suppliers list, 
raising suspicion about the legitimacy of the selection procedure (Gomery, 2005a), in 
particular considering the firm’s generous donations to the Liberal Party in the second half of 
the 90s. 
In many cases, the firm obtained important sponsorship contracts without any competing bid 
thank to its privileged relationship with APORS’s president.  
By the end of the Program, in 1993, Lafleur handled on the Government behalf contracts 
worth around $65 million, with significant profits in particular for the owner’s family 
(Gomery, 2005a). 
Groupaction was also an important contributor of the Liberal Party of Canada, and it was 
selected for the Sponsorship Program along with a small number of other firms (all Liberal 
Party supporters), while several other firms were completely discarded. Th Gomery 
Commission (2005a, p. 245) reports the hearings of the Prime Minister on the subject and on 
possible justifications of the adopted strategy: 
 
“The Sponsorship Program was not partisan. It was not about the Liberal Party. It was about 
promoting the visibility of Canada in Quebec. A conventional wisdom had nonetheless been 
created about “Liberal friendly” advertising agencies. 
We have to be very careful about labels. In Quebec, there are basically two types of 
advertising agencies; those who are “separatist friendly” and those who are “federalist 
friendly”. 
“Federalist friendly” agencies tended to support the Conservatives when they were in power 
and the Liberals when they were in power. I do hope the Government of Canada used 
“federalist friendly” agencies to promote the visibility of Canada in Quebec, not because the 
agencies contributed to the Liberal Party until we abolished corporate donations or 
contributions, but because the only alternative in practical terms was to use “separatist 
friendly” agencies to promote Canada” (Hearings, Transcripts vol. 72, pp. 12516-12517). 
 
These reasons can justify the exclusion of firms from the Program, but don’t justify the total 
lack of fair public competition for such a relevant project. The president of Groupaction 
admitted that the firm occasionally overcharged PWGSC and took care of relationships with 
key political figures for personal gain (including Liberal Party fundraiser with fundamental 
contacts with important public servants), providing them a wide range of benefits, but denied 
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any involvement for political ideals. Between the 1996 and 2002, Groupaction and its 
subsidiaries managed sponsorships worth around $90 million (Gomery, 2005a). 
 
Liberal Party fundraisers also had an important role: providing contacts for sponsorship 
payments to Groupaction, in exchange of commission payments, becoming key actors in the 
interconnections between public servants and private firms involved in the network.  
One of the main fundraiser’s company, PluriDesign, even received sub-contracts for hundreds 
of thousands of dollars from the advertising firms involved in the network. 
 
All the firms directly involved in the scandal offered donations to the Liberal Party, both in 
conform and illegal ways, with the clear intention of getting better connections with public 
servants exclusively for personal gain, underlying the risky possible consequences of related 
to relationships between businesses and politics (especially if when they are based on 
financial contributions). 
 





Figure 4.2 The Canadian Government’s Sponsorship Program Corruption Network 
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4.4.3 Role of accounting in the realization of the corruption network 
 
The scandal started after the Report of the Auditor General to the House of Commons, where 
have been initially presented the key characteristics of the Sponsorship Program corruption 
network, later summarized and studied by the Gomery Commission (2005b): 
 
• failures of internal control systems; 
• lack of adequate documentation and bureaucracy to justify significant expenditures 
of public money; 
• the payment of large sums of money to private firms, even without any kind of 
service provided; 
•  systematic disregard of the rules and procedures regarding public procurement; 
• irregular lack of competition in the selection of agencies directly and indirectly 
involved in the project; 
• a general bypassing of Parliament’s authority. 
 
Many of these elements are present in most cases of corruption networks regarding public 
procurement: in this case in particular, the almost total lack of transparency and the excessive 
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independence of the Sponsorship Program from central authorities are seen as the main causes 
of the success of the corruption network.  
The role of the Commission was to provide an “investigation into the issues and events 
referred to in the terms of reference” (Gomery, 2005a, p. 524), without conducting a trial and 
without “establishing criminal culpability or civil responsibility” of the involved parties, 
studying the scandal to provide recommendations to effectively prevent and fight similar 
episodes in the future.  
 
 
The Gomery Commission identified a series of key elements, to allow a more accurate 
understanding of the reasons behind the failure of the control systems and the success of the 
corruption network: 
 
1. “the identity of those who received the sponsorship, communications and advertising 
funds, including any commissions or fees payable with respect to them…the purpose 
for which the funds were disbursed, and the extent of value for money received in 
return by the Government of Canada…; 
 
2. whether there was political influence on the distribution of the funds, including 
questions relating to whether there were direct or indirect political contributions or 
gifts made by recipients of the funds; 
 
3. whether there were sufficient external monitoring and financial controls used by fund 
recipients described in 1 above; if not, why not and to what effect” (Gomery, 2005a, p. 
533, emphasis added). 
 
 
Overcharging was one of the most common strategies adopted within the network, with the 
adoption of simple but effective techniques, very common in this kind of corruption network.  
The techniques reported by the Gomery Commission as examples of overcharging include 
inflation of hourly rates, invoices without any corresponding services provided and even 
double billing for the same service. 
Eight main categories of consistent overbilling practices adopted by the advertising firm 




1. even many employees and officers of the firm didn’t know what kind of work could 
be invoiced as production costs and which agency services were covered by a 12% 
commission, which was contractually paid to the company even when no service was 
provided; 
 
2. presentations of the projects were provided at a flat rate of $2750 each, the price was 
justified as industry standard and as an approximate average of the costs sustained for 
the realization of a mock-up (even if, according to the firm’s employees themselves, 
the real cost was around $300); 
 
3. costly hours of works, attributed directly to the owner of the firm, were charged even 
on projects where he wasn’t involved at all (including even the production of 
promotional items); 
 
4. the charges for hours worked were in many cases billed at much higher rates than 
those justified by the nature of the service provided (for example $245 an hour paid 
for packaging and shipping promotional items, while the industry average was less 
than $40 an hour); 
 
5. the amount presented in the contract as an allowance for production costs was 
generally billed in full, with an upwards adjustment of the invoice in case of works 
less time-consuming than expected; 
 
6. unjustified variations of the working hours billed for the same event, when it was 
sponsored for more than one year. A sponsorship of the Montreal Expos in 1995 and 
renewed for the same amount in 1996, but the number of reported hours of work went 
from 234 to 1105, without any explanation; 
 
7. even people who were reported as employees of Lafleur Communications started to 
bill Lafleur for the services they provided, as they were independent contractors, 
allowing Lafleur to rebill faking higher expenses and, additionally, billing the hours 




8. the subcontracts were assigned without any regular competition (standard practice 
during the entire history of the corruption network), in some cases justifying the 
decision saying it was mandatory for the urgency to complete certain operations. Some 
projects where even offered to Publicité Dezert, an advertising firm controlled by the 
same family in charge of Lafleur Communications. Subcontracts didn’t allow any time 
savings and didn’t provide any effective additional know-how to the program and the 
services provided where generally pretty simple and generic and could have easily 
been offered by the advertising agencies already involved in the Sponsorship Program. 
The relationships between Lafleur and its subcontractors were just a way to justify 
higher mark-ups on the services provided and, consequently, higher bills. 
 
These strategies allowed the owner of Lafleur Communications to justify and legitimize 
continuous infringements of regulations and the direct and indirect appropriations of millions 
of dollars, even through his family members and their firms.  
The accounting practices previously summarized were used in a wide range of different 
events and sponsorships, even unrelated to the Sponsorship Program, from the sponsorship of 
the Grand Prix du Canada in 1996 to the payment and distribution of copies of the 
Encyclopédie du Canada in schools in 1997 (Gomery, 2005b). 
 
The advertising agencies involved were able to successfully implement the accounting tools 
and practices described in the previous chapters, using them to build a profitable corruption 
network, adapting the same principles to different settings, repeating undisturbed the same 
procedures and creating an effective habitus, without the needs to create slush funds; even 
occasional bribes were paid directly by the advertising firms, in most cases disguised as 
irregular “donations” towards fundraisers and other key political figures (Gomery, 2005a). 
 
 
The Commission criticized the total lack of internal control and questioning from PWGSC, 
especially regarding the use of invoices, not exclusively concerning the case of overcharging, 
but also in relation to expenses completely unrelated to the promotion of national unity or any 
key aspect of the Sponsorship Program, including even tickets for sport events (Gomery, 
2005b) 
The advertising agencies involved in the network relied on subcontractors to get around the 
intent of the government’s contracting policy, with additional costs and no benefits for the 
project: the practice most widely adopted allowed the advertising firms involved (mostly 
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LaFleur Communications and its subcontractors) to split a mark-up on the cost of the services 
provided and even profiting from additional commissions.  
 
The illegal activities of the network remained undetected for years despite the audits 
periodically conducted by the Audit and Ethics Branch (AEB), in charge of checking on the 
legitimacy of the operations of government organizations.  
Even an audit provided by Ernst & Young in 1996 (at the time auditor in other organizations 
of the Canadian government) indicated instances of noncompliance to policies and 
procedures, but the actors in charge didn’t intervene (Gomery, 2005a). 
Kroll Lindquist Avey carried out an administrative review of the Sponsorship Program even 
before the formation of the Commission, founding episodes of noncompliance in almost every 
file reviewed (2005): irregularities where significant regarding both certifications for payment 
of invoices and bids for sponsorship contracts. 
 
The mismanagement of the Sponsorship Program was also caused by an almost complete 
absence of guidelines and criteria to determine the accomplishment of key objectives and 
result (which would have allowed a more accurate valuation of the program), but this kind of 
policies would have been implemented only from 2001, by Communication Canada.  
After the initial reports regarding the contracts with communication agencies, irregularities 
started to emerge and when the government tried to intervene and fix the Program, the 
strategies and connections involving the protagonists of the network gradually became clear 





The Gomery Commission was formed specifically to provide recommendations to avoid 
similar episodes in the future, and after its investigation and analysis summarized its findings 
in a few fundamental key points (Gomery, 2005b): 
 
• evidence of political involvement at different levels of the Program’s management; 
 




• circumvention of proper contracting procedures and basic reporting, even at the very 
senior levels of the public services; 
 
• blind obedience of public servants to the will of their managers, despite the 
irregularities of their practices; 
 
• significant and unjustified overcharging by advertising agencies; 
 
• artificially inflated commissions and production costs, even if they were unrelated to 
the program; 
 
• involvement of the Sponsorship Program even on project completely unrelated to 
national unity, for a lack of clear guidelines and final objectives; 
 
• actions meant to avoid compliance with federal legislation and contracting policies, 
including the Canada Elections Act, Lobbyists Registration Act, Access to 
Information Act, Financial Administration act and Treasury Board Transfer Payments 
Policy; 
 
• a complex network of cash flows among government organizations and advertising 
private agencies, providing profits to the actors involved; 
 
• channelling of funds from advertising agencies to political fundraising activities in 
Québec, to improve connections and receive additional government contracts; 
 
• enlistment of people working for the Liberal Party even on the advertising agencies’ 
payrolls; 
 
• the refusal of Ministers to acknowledge and public servants to acknowledge their role 
and responsibility in the management of the program. 
 
 
Starting from these findings, the Commission provided a series of recommendations which 
regulators should consider to prevent and fight this kind of episodes in the future, promoting 
the key requirements discussed in the previous chapters (accountability and transparency in 
primis), with a particular emphasis on the role of control systems, especially regarding the 
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management of public servants, stopping them from the instauration of personal and corrupt 
relationships with the private firms involved in the projects (Gomery, 2005b), while 
promoting whistle-blowing channels and increasing penalties. 
 
The same suggestions are valid for most kind of public procurement setting, including the 
MOSE scandal. As previously seen, public procurement still offers many opportunities for 
illegal activities and for irregular handling of public money. These two cases report all the key 
elements used by Beets (2005) to explain the relationships between public procurement and 
corruption networks: from the inevitable lack of accountability generated by the distance (and 
in these cases independence) between actors and stakeholders to the management of financial 
resources to fund political campaigns and to bribe key figures. These conclusions also 
confirm the theory of Khan (2006), mentioned in the first chapter: the leaders and main 
organizers of the corruption networks were in both cases public officials in charge of dealing 
with private firms. 
 
Both corruption networks used simple accounting practices to legitimize the embezzlement of 
the funds they managed and to build the repartition system of their illegal profits and both 
scandals were uncovered after controls related to accounting procedures.  
In the MOSE cases, the inquiry started after a Fiscal Police’s control for suspected tax evasion 
related to the misuse of invoices, irregular but accurately reported by the components of the 
network. In the Canadian case, instead, the illegal practice where uncovered by a qualitative 
audit of management to control, always to clarify some suspicious transactions form previous 
years’ records (Sutherland, 2003). 
As long as accounting tools are adopted (and it becomes inevitable when millions of dollars 
are involved), control systems will have ways to prove and identify irregularities. 
 
Both scandals received wide media coverage and were the main subjects of political debate, 
also because of the political figures directly or indirectly involved in different areas of the 
areas. For the high number of components and for the amount of  money involved in the 
project, both cases were perceived as wake-up calls to change and improve the current 
systems, trying to find solutions to the phenomenon and trying to understand the failures of 
control systems. Millions of public funds were stolen during the realization of both projects 
which, since the beginning, offered great opportunities of personal gains for the component of 
the network.  
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In the Canadian Sponsorship Program, the corruption network didn’t even have to constantly 
bribe people in charge of control systems: for years auditors and people in charge of the 
project failed to identify the several red flags of the program, accepting unjustified and 
unpredictable spending, while satisfying the yearly audit of the project (Sutherland, 2003); the 
few criticisms presented remained completely unheard. 
 
The illegal contributions of both the corruption networks to political parties reflect the 
importance of relationships with key political figures in this kind of projects, often outside the 
circle of relationships initially planned for the nature of the project. 
Connections are important also in developed countries and, when the projects involve 
hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars, they can be more valuable than cash flows. 
For these reasons even the MOSE corruption network decided to illegally fund the electoral 
campaign of the Venice mayor, even if he wasn’t involved in the network. 
Even when significant resources have been invested to internal and external control systems 
(like in the Canadian case) and accountability and transparency are recognized as crucial, 
especially when public funds are involved, there are always grey areas which can be exploited 
for personal gains, independently form the nature and from the mode of the benefits provided 
(from regular bribery to occasional supply of services).      
 
These practices reflect very common problems which are still relevant worldwide and are not 
exclusively related to the embezzlement of public money for personal gain. Elections are 
inevitably expensive, especially in developed democratic countries, and political campaigns 
are becoming more and more costly (Johnston, 2005), reaching the right amount of funding is 
crucial for any political party. These strategies of financing can easily involve billions of 
dollars and a very wide range of sponsors, creating a potentially fertile ground for opaque 
interconnections and corruption networks; it’s clear that the importance of connections isn’t 
an exclusive practice of tyrannical governments, but is a theme still extremely relevant even 
in the most developed and unexpected settings.  
Procedures of internal control and regulations regarding financing during political campaigns 
have not been completely successful, considering how common corruption still is in this 
environment; stricter regulations (like in the Canadian case) often don’t stop illegal cash flows 
but simply change the ways illegal payments are made, in most cases recurring to more or less 
advanced accounting tools (Sutherland, 2003). 
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The practice of lobbying has become widespread and accepted in countries like Canada, 
where the two largest Canadian political parties (the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party) 
have become more and more dependent on donations and contributions from private 
corporations, especially during the last decades, inevitably increasing the influence of the 
private sectors in industries like health, environment and taxation, creating more and more 
interconnections between politicians and businessmen, both in official and unofficial ways 
(Neu et al., 2013). These connections can become even more effective and dangerous when 
these relationships become more personal and informal, as seen during the MOSE affair. 
 
 Public management has clearly many faults and in many situations it was completely 
inadequate considering the amount of funds involved and the duration of the corruption 
episodes, but since the beginning of the projects was guaranteed great independence from the 
central authority (in both the cases presented in the chapter). 
Both projects, in fact, were perceived as urgent and costly by the respective governments and 
for these reasons in both cases were offered the possibility to public organizations 
(respectively NVC and APORS), directly put in charge to handle the relationships and related 
contracts and subcontracts with private firms in charge of the project; APORS and its 
connections even ended up bypassing the Parliament’s approvals, becoming de facto allowed 
to spend as much as they wanted when they needed it.  
 
The complex nature of the projects and the opaqueness regarding final budgets and techniques 
to be adopted to measure the performance of the firms involved (especially for the Canadian 
Scandal), provided fertile ground for irregular invoicing and assignment of important works 
to trusted parties. The lack of legitimate selection of deserving firms was in part a strategy to 
speed up the selection and, consequently, the entire project, avoiding a time-consuming 
bureaucratic public competition. Inevitably, this strategy eliminated the economic benefits of 
competition and allowed the private firms to build stronger relationships with the government 









Literature worldwide still hasn’t fully understood the corruption phenomenon and its wide 
range of tools, tricks and practices. As seen in the cases analysed in the previous chapter and 
in the rest of the work, no country or firm is completely safe from the phenomenon and its 
consequences, regardless of optimistic statistics and positive global rankings. For its peculiar 
and opaque nature and for its significant presence in so many settings, the effectiveness of 
control systems (both internal and external) can never be completely trusted in the prevention 
and fight against the phenomenon, independently from the amount of funds invested and the 
quality of control processes. Corruption is probably impossible to completely classify and 
eradicate and it has been changing over the past decades, widely and successfully adopting 
new tools while exploiting the opportunities provided by a more and more interconnected 
corporate world, indirectly affecting countries and realities where the phenomenon has been 
fought more effectively.  
For these reasons the problem right now is more alarming and important than ever and needs 
to be studied and investigated in all its forms, from petty corruption in developing countries to 
massive corporate corruption scandals in the developed ones. 
 
Accounting practices have been in many cases the backbone of very successful and durable 
corruption networks, but accounting controls also provided proof of irregular transactions and 
links between the same networks’ components, gradually uncovering massive scandals.  
It’s important to consider that, as seen in the rest of the work, the accounting practices 
adopted within most corruption networks (including the networks worldwide still active and 
profitable right now) tend to be similar for organization and for the roles of the actors 
involved. They also generally rely on very basic accounting tools in particular regarding 
public procurements, where corruption still prospers worldwide. Additional controls on 
invoicing processes and a greater supervision over spending of public money may allow to 
detect corruption episodes earlier, but they would inevitably generate a general slowdown of 
many projects and investments involving public funds with inevitable wastes of time and 
money; the protagonists of the MOSE and Sponsorship Program scandals were granted great 
independence and allowed to bypass controls for the same reason. 
 
The effort and investments of international institutions can’t be effective if it isn’t accepted 
and implemented even by smaller businesses and local governments, considering how the 
phenomenon is still widespread and deep-rooted in so many environments worldwide. 
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Controls are inevitably costly and time-consuming, especially when they involve accounting 
practices: businesses and governments need to find the right compromise between money 
savings and inadequate levels of supervision, with the risk of higher damages and costs in the 
long term.  
Stricter controls and regulations regarding the financing of political parties and additional 
benefits provided to public officials could allow a progressive limitation of opaque and 
irregular interconnections between the public and private firms, even in the most developed 
democratic countries, where relationships which should constantly follow the principles of 
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